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FAIR EMPLOYMENT FOR THE HOMOSEXUAL
IRVING KOVARSKY*
Psychological and Medical Views and Employment
Homosexuals living in Judaic-Christian territory have always fared
badly, being consistently treated with considerable hostility. While no
longer stoned to death, as required in the ancient rabbinical codes, or
burned at the stake or castrated, as ordered by the ecclesiastical courts,
homosexuals remain ostracized.' That religious, social and economic
punishment can be as severe as that meted out by a judge in a criminal
proceeding needs little amplification. Recently, Illinois 2 and Connecti-
cut 3 changed their criminal codes to legalize homosexual acts between
consenting adults. This may indicate that the homosexual is today more
acceptable in social and economic situations.
Past and current psychological and medical doctrine is helpful in
deciding whether homosexuals should be protected by a fair employment
law, the subject of this article. Unfortunately, while many "scientific"
explanations are available, none are universally accepted. There is wide
acceptance of the view that homosexual experiences start before or dur-
ing adolescence with other youngsters or adults.4 Some feel that a homo-
sexual or heterosexual climate is established unknowingly by conditions
* Professor of Business Administration. University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa.
I. LEvITIcus 20:3; M. BUCKLEY, MORALITY AND THE HOMOSEXUAL 128 (1959); 1 F. POLLACK
& F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 26 (2d ed. 1898).
2. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 11-3. 11-4, 11-5. & 11-9 (Smith-Hurd, 1961).
3. PUB. L. No. 828, § 214 repealing, GEN. STAT. OF CONN. ch. 944, § 53-216 (1969). [Editor's
note: Oregon has recently followed the lead of Illinois and Connecticut; see 1971 ORE. LAWS ch.
743, §§ 112-16, repealing, ORE. REV. STAT. § 167.040 (1953) (effective Jan. 1, 1972).]
4. I. BIEBER, HOMOSEXUALITY: A PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY 8 (1962).
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in the home.5 In some instances, sexual choice occurs after maturity.' It
is possible that a child is born without a sexual preference and the pref-
erence is later developed by environmental factors. For example, con-
victs with heterosexual leanings often engage in homosexual practices
while in prison. 7
Kraft-Ebing felt that homosexuality was a physical trait acquired at
birth, a theory in disrepute for some time.8 It was recently suggested that
there was an endocrine imbalance in the male homosexual.' This theory
supports the view that homosexual behavior is due to physical character-
istics rather than environment. In a study recently published, the re-
searchers found a significant variance in the sperm count between the
exclusive (or almost exclusive) homosexual and the heterosexual male.'"
It is perhaps noteworthy that some psychologists and psychiatrists
adhering to the environmental, bisexual or physical trait theory do not
consider the homosexual mentally disturbed or incapable." This be-
comes important when rationally discussing employment opportunities
for the homosexual.
The probability of homosexual play is something different from the
innate capacity or potential. While there may be some innate predisposi-
tion toward homosexuality in everyone, outward signs are principally
exhibited by males under 20 years of age.'2 The leaning or innate tend-
ency toward homosexual expression can be explained on a physiological
basis-boys reach a state of optimum sexual intensity during adoles-
cence, a period during which heterosexual contact is discouraged. Some-
times the dominant role of the mother and the mouse-type father signals
5. Id. at 44-117.
6. Id. at 14-15.
7. Compare the bisexual preference of the ancient Greek. See H. LICHT, SEXUAL LIFE IN ANCIENT
GREECE 413-17 (1932); W. STEKEL. BI-SEXUAL LOVE 56 (1944).
8. Margolese, Homosexuality: A New Endocrine Correlate, I HORIONES AND BEHAVIOR 151
(Feb.. 1970).
9. Id.
10. Kolodny. Masters, Hendryz and Toro, Plasma Testosterone and Semen Analysis in Male
Homosexuals, 285 NEW ENGLAND J. OF MEDICINE 1170 (Nov. 18, 1971). It was also reported in
this study that "[slixty per cent described sexual encounter with an adult male before the age of
16, whereas 97 per cent had sexual experience with a peer-group male before 16. For all subjects
current patterns of sexual behavior included fellatio, and 63 per cent also acknowledged anal
intercourse." And the physical and mental health of this group was reported good. "Two subjects
were currently in psychotherapy, and one other subject had previously consulted a psychiatrist. No
paranoia or paranoid-like symptomatology was apprent in the group." Id. at 1171-72.
A similar result was published by Loraine. Ismail. Adamopolous. and Dore. Endocrine Functions
in Male and Female Homosexuals. 4 BRITISH MEDICAL J. 406 (1970). See also Dorner. Hormonal
Induction and Prevention of Female Homosexuality, 42 J. OF ENDICRONOLOGY 163 (1968) and
Dorner and Hinz, Induction and Prevention of Male Homosexuality by Androgen. 40 J. or
ENDICORONOLOGY 387 (1968).
I1. M. HOFFMAN, THE GAY WORLD: MALE HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE SOCIAL CREATION OF
EVIL 121-22 (Bantam ed. 1968).
V) Q ICTrTM. 4ZCViiA1 th-AVfflR AND THE LAW 102-03 (1965).
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inverse sexual preference. 3 While this explanation is speculative, the
incidence rate of homosexual behavior shows that it most frequently
occurs between boys ranging in age from 4 to 13 and drops somewhat
in the 14 to 20 range. Homosexual experiences drop considerably after
20 years of age, due to the increased availability of heterosexual contact
and public disapproval.
Dr. Kinsey concluded that 4 percent of the adult male population in
the United States will remain exclusively homosexual throughout life,
with 37 percent having some overt homosexual experience. 4 Further-
more, 10 percent of the male population between 16 and 65 years of age
will remain exclusively homosexual for at least 3 years. 15 In England, it
is estimated that 5 percent of the male population is predominantly
homosexual, a figure that corresponds with the sampling taken by Dr.
Kinsey.
Dr. Kinsey estimates that there are at least two and one-quarter mil-
lion confirmed homosexuals in the United States over the age 18.16 A
government task force in 1969 estimated "that there are currently three
or four million adults in the United States who are predominantly hom-
osexual and many more individuals in whose lives homosexual tenden-
cies or behavior play a significant role.'7 The estimate for England is a
minimum of 500,000 hard core homosexuals.'" It is also estimated that
I percent of those serving in the United States military forces are con-
firmed homosexuals.
In a detailed study undertaken in England of criminal charges pre-
ferred against homosexuals, 19 percent involved males 50 years of age
or older. Significantly, 23 percent of the cases involved married, wid-
owed, or divorced males. Of this statistical category, 25.7 percent were
childless while the balance fathered children or had a pregnant wife. This
figure corresponds to statistics later presented.
The statistics bear further consideration in light of available employ-
ment opportunities, both private and public, for the homosexual. With
4 percent of the male population exclusively homosexual 2 and a consid-
erably larger number admitting to bisexual activity, employment oppor-
tunity is important to the national economy as well as to the individual.
Even if all criminal laws regulating homosexual expression between con-
13. B. MAGEE, ONE IN TWENTY: A STUDY OF HOMOSEXUALITY IN MEN AND WOMEN 30-32
(1966).
14, A KINSEY, C. MARTIN & W. POMEROY, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE (1948).
15. SCOTTISH HOME DEPT.. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENCES AND
PROSTITUTION 17 (1957) (The Wolfenden Report).
16. KINSEY. supra note 14, at 648.
17. FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON HOMOSEXUALITY 4 (English Report, 1969).
18. A. GIGEROFF, SEXUAL DEVIATIONS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 89 (1968).
19. L RADZINOWICZ, SEXUAL OFFENCES 113-19 (1957).
11) V- - - -1 A -~ fAQ
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senting adults were repealed, it is unlikely that, given the state of public
opinion, employment opportunity would increase substantially. Many
homosexuals are forced to find employment where antagonism is less
evident or live in fear of being discovered, which can affect efficiency.
An assumption herein made is that the sexual and the bisexual will face
similar employment experiences. There is a problem of considerable
magnitude when anywhere from 4 to 20 percent of our adult male popu-
lation can anticipate employment difficulty if homosexual behavior is
established or suspected.
Economists, public leaders and others display considerable interest in
the gross national product, an indicator of economic well-being, without
considering discrimination faced by the homosexual. While the employ-
ment rights of minorities are protected by state and federal law as a
means of meeting economic objectives, no concern is shown in the in-
come of the homosexual. Public policy in the United States calls for full
employment, an unreal goal. Therefore, there is a general consensus of
opinion that 4 percent unemployment, or less, is socially tolerable. 2 The
unemployment rate of the homosexual may or may not vary from the
national averages, but he faces discrimination and reduced income in the
more skilled and desirable jobs.
In addition, the failure to provide adequate economic opportunity
geared to skill and education has an impact on the male facing antago-
nism from the employer. The self-interest of the homosexual in employ-
ment is evident and needs little comment, but the employer is something
else. Given his prejudices and a genuine interest in uplifting morale in
the plant, the employer is reluctant to hire the effeminate male or known
homosexual. Statistically, however, the large employer is bound to hire
sexually inverted employees, since most homosexuals are not effeminate
and are unidentified. Thus the homosexual employee who is aware of the
employer's policy toward homosexuals lives in fear knowing that he will
lose his job and will be unable to find other employment if discovered.2"
A reasonable assumption is that the "closet" homosexual performs less
efficiently because of inner torment (however, the homosexual may per-
form in a superior fashion so that his employer finds him indispensable).
The employer maximizing profit should be interested in the mental well-
being of the unknown (and known) homosexual employee.
21. EcoNOxtic REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 76 (Feb.. 1971).
22. Homosexual Fights Rule in Security Clearance. N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1967, at 70, col. 3;
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With some exceptions -hair-dressing, theatre, design, etc.-the
known homosexual can count on losing his job. Professionals who are
found out have been booted out of their chosen vocation, and a license
to practice denied or taken away for moral reasons.23 Detected civil
servants and servicemen have been discharged. 24 In fact, an alien with
homosexual leanings prior to entry into the United States can be de-
ported.35 The increased militancy and visibility of the homosexual proba-
bly makes it more difficult for him to earn a living at the present time.
The Military
Intelligence reports prepared by the Army, Navy and Air Force and
additional data supplied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
Central Intelligence Agency classify the homosexual as a poor military
risk. A Senate report, based on intelligence provided by the military and
other federal agencies, states:
The lack of emotional stability . . . found in most sex perverts and the
weakness of their moral fiber, makes them susceptible to the blandish-
ments of the foreign espionage agent. It is the experience of the intelligence
experts that perverts are vulnerable to interrogation by a skilled ques-
tioner and they seldom refuse to talk about themselves. Furthermore,
most perverts tend to congregate at the same. . . clubs. . . which places
can be identified . . . making it possible for a recruiting agent to develop
clandestine relationships which can be used for espionage purposes. 26
Those responsible for this Senate report show distaste for the homo-
sexual by citing non-existent facts and consistently referring to him as a
"pervert." While there has been some softening in official military atti-
tude since 1950, the date of this Senate report, a vast majority of those
in the military support the Senate position. 27
23. See, e.g., Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of N.M., 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
24. Vigil v. Post Office Dept., 406 F.2d 921 (10th Cir. 1969); Anonymous v. Macy, 398 F.2d
317 (5th Cir. 1968); Note, Homosexuals in the Military, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 465 (1969).
25. Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118 (1967). The plaintiff had
been arrested in Canada for homosexual behavior, but the case was dismissed. But he admitted
homosexual acts since 14 years of age. The plaintiff, 32 years of age and living in the United States
for 8 years, was deported under the 1952 Immigration Act as a "psychopathic personality." While
no one knows what a "psychopathic personality" is-Congress did not even define it-and the
plaintiff was not tested, the Supreme Court ruled that deportation was proper.
26. EMPLOYIENT OF HoMiOSEXUALS AND OTHER SEX PERVERTS IN GOVERNMENT, S. Misc. Doc.
No. 241. 8 1st Cong., 2d Sess. at 4-5 (1950).
27. Williams and Weinberg, The Military. Its Processing of Accused Homosexuals. 14 AM.
BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 203 (1970); MEDICAL FITNESS STANDARDS FOR APPOINTMENT, ENLISTNENT
AND INDUCrION, AR 40-51,2-34 a (b).
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The report refers to "the experience of intelligence experts that per-
verts are vulnerable to interrogation by a skilled questioner .... "I'
Where this information came from and how this information was gath-
ered remains a secret. Were a large enough number of homosexuals
exposed to the kind of grilling implied to support this assertion? It seems
doubtful. But even if the homosexual is "vulnerable to interrogation by
a skilled questioner," isn't the heterosexual in the military equally sus-
ceptible? It is doubtful whether "gay" people are more inclined to crack
up under experienced grilling than "straight" people.
Another questionable conclusion is the alleged tendency of homosex-
uals to talk about themselves. All kinds of people have a need, some less
frequently than others, to discuss events in their life with friends. The
homosexual knows that society views him as a leper, and it is not often
that he will talk about himself to outsiders. There has been, in recent
years, a greater willingness on the part of the homosexual to be identified
and to speak freely, 29 but most still prefer to remain anonymous.
Another doubtful conclusion reached by the Senate committee is the
tendency of "perverts . . .to congregate at the same . . . clubs .... "
For those pursuing anonymity-homosexuals try to avoid noto-
riety-congregating at "clubs" is risky. In England, Holland, Illinois,
Connecticut and other areas where the homosexual cannot be criminally
accused, there is less need to operate secretively. But even 'if criminal
prosecution is not feared, the homosexual fears loss of job or blackmail
and tries to avoid the "gay" watering hole.
Military policy as it affects the homosexual is of interest in light of
the recent homophylic effort to change military policy.3 While the mili-
tary has found the homosexual above average in intelligence, education,
and performance, there remains an unwillingness to induct or retain
him. 31 The "straight" or "gay" reluctantly join the military today and
necessity may force a reexamination of policy in the military. Homosex-
ual organizations claim that they wish to serve in the military for pa-
triotic reasons, 32 but this is suspect because of the general unpopularity
of the Vietnam War. There is a strong possibility that the type of mili-
28. S. Misc. Doc. No. 241,supra note 26, at 4-5.
29. Alverson. U.S. Homosexuals Gain In Trying to Persuade Society to Accept Them, Wall
Street Journal, July 17, 1968, at 1, col. I; 78 NEWSWEEK, August 23, 1971, at 45; N.Y. Times,
June 28, 1971, at 23, col. 3.
30. War Role Sought for Homosexuals, N.Y. Times, April 17, 1966, at 12, col. I.
31. J. GERASSi, THE Boys OF BOISE, 100-01 (1966).
32. N.Y. Times, supra note 30.
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tary discharge and stigma of not having served, which could affect the
ability of a homosexual to earn a living, motivates the patriotic stance.
But if the homosexual was a good or superior solder in the Greek city-
state 3 3 it is possible that he can serve with distinction today.
During World War II, homosexuals were dishonorably discharged
from the military. In 1943, the Army processed 20,620 constitutional
psychopaths, of which 1,625 were classified as homosexuals.3 Later, the
official policy of the military was somewhat liberalized; those "caught
in the act" or admitting homosexual acts were still given a dishonorable
discharge, but others were granted an honorable discharge.3 5 After
World War II, enlisted men who could not adapt because of homosexual
tendencies were given an honorable discharge if no sexual offense was
committed while in service.36 The Army still felt that homosexuals were
not good soldiers because they were unreliable, sought special favors,
negatively influenced the "normal" soldier, and were susceptible to
blackmail.
Most homosexuals, active or inactive, waltz through life undetected,
and it seems reasonable to presume that they also serve in the military
undetected. Thus, the change in policy was probably unimportant for the
bulk of homosexuals in the military. But to those detected or admitting
homosexuality, leaving the military without an honorable discharge sig-
nals harrassment when seeking employment. After World War II and
the undeclared wars in Korea and Vietnam, veterans received job prefer-
ences, bonuses, and free education, and a veteran with a dishonorable
or undesirable discharge suffered.
The typical soldier accused of homosexual behavior or tendencies
leaves the military without a fight, accepting a "dishonorable" or
"other than honorable" discharge.3 7 Rarely would the accused seek a
reversal of the military decision and an "honorable" discharge. But in
Clackum v. United States'3 a female soldier was ushered out of the
military with an other than honorable discharge, which falls between an
honorable and a dishonorable discharge. Air Force regulations in effect
33. D WEST, THE OTHER MAN: A STLDY OF THE SOCIAL, LEGAL AND CLINICAL AsPEcTs OF
HOxiOSEXUALITY 25-29 (1955).
34. Note, Homosexuals in the Military, 37 FOROHAM L. REV. 465,466 (1969).
35. Id. at 467.
36. Id
37. Williams and Weinberg, The Military. Its Processing oJ Accused Homosexuals. 1,A .sM.
BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 203 (1970).
38. Clackum v. United States, 296 F.2d 226 (Ct. Cf. 1960).
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provided that a summary discharge 9 was proper without establishing,
by acceptable evidence, homosexuality. The female soldier was given a
psychiatric examination, lasting for half an hour, and a diagnosis of
"sexual deviate manifested by homosexual" tendencies was made.4" The
court ordered that the other than honorable discharge be replaced by an
honorable discharge because the "Air Force has the undoubted right to
discharge her. . . for any reason or for no reason . . .[to] preserve the
Air Force from even the slightest suspicion of harboring undesirable
characters. But it is unthinkable that it should have the raw power,
without respect for even the most elementary notions of due process of
law, to load her down with penalties."41
The court criticized the summary discharge, a military procedure
designed to expedite justice, because of the lack of due process. It is
unthinkable, even unprofessional, that a psychiatrist can decide in half
an hour that a person is a latent homosexual, without substantiation,
and the military drum the victim out of service without a hearing. The
court was aware of the fact that the less than honorable discharge would
handicap the plaintiff in the future. The court managed to achieve an
equitable solution by finding the procedure unfair.
Most homosexuals are given an administrative or summary discharge,
waiving their right to a full hearing. These boards are not required to
follow court procedure, and many released with less than an honorable
discharge would "win" if their cases were brought before a military
tribunal.4 2 Rather than face the publicity of a full hearing, many simply
accept a dishonorable or other than honorable discharge.
Government Employment
Minorities facing hostility in the United States have seen some
change, and the homosexual hopes to eventually benefit as another mi-
nority -group. Black organizations promote the "Black is Beautiful"
slogan to instill pride and a sense of community. To a lesser extent,
Mexicans, Jews, and Italians have undertaken similar promotions.
Homophylic organizations are now conducting similar drives to instill
39. Without a hearing. Id.
40. 296 F.2d at 226.
41. Id. at 228. For what appears to be a contrary decision, see Grant v. United States, 162 Ct,
CI. 600 (1963).
42. Williams and Weinberg, The Military, Its Processing of Accused Homosexuals, 14 AMI.
BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 212-15 (1970).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss4/1
FAIR EMPLOYMENT
self-respect in the homosexual and gain public acceptance.4 3 Homo-
sexuals often seek confrontation and fair play, no longer content to wage
defensive actions like providing bail bond, legal aid, etc. Instead, they
sponsor offensive legal programs, political involvement, open and well-
publicized discussions, picketing, etc."
A recent editorial appearing in The Washington Post stated:
Persecution of homosexuals is as senseless as it is unjust. They may
have valuable gifts and insights to bring to public service. If they are
qualified for a job in terms of intelligence, experience and skill, if they
conduct themselves, like other employees, with reasonable circumspection
and decorum, their private sexual behavior is their own business; it is none
of the government's business so long as it does not affect their independ-
ence and reliability. Like anyone else, they have a right to privacy, a right
to opportunity and a right to serve their country.45
The New York Times reports change in public employment policy in
New York City during 1966.4 Based on these changes, known homosex-
uals are eligible for employment. It was reported:
In the past, an investigator could reject an applicant if "by his appear-
ance, actions, or attitudes he appeared to be a homosexual," a spokesman
said.
"Now, if he gives us the impression that he can do the job, and has all
the other qualifications, we say he should be hired," the spokesman con-
tinued.
These changes in hiring procedures were made quietly and without
public notice. .... 1
However, the homosexual was not to be hired in a job requiring contact
with young people or with people easily "swayed." This policy did not,
evidently, extend to the acknowledged or convicted homosexual. It was
a limited change, important because it was a beginning. The 1966 em-
ployment policy was changed in 1969, when the Civil Service Commis-
43. Homosexuals Proud of Deviancy, Medical Academy Study Finds, N.Y. Times, May 19,
1964. at I, col. 2.
44. U.S. Homosexuals Gain in Trying to Persuade Society to Accept Them, Wall Street Journal,
July 17, 1968, at 1, col. 1; Homosexuals Ask Candidates' Ideas, N.Y. Times, August 19, 1968, at
21, col. 1; Criticism by Two Officials at Columbia Anger Leaders of Student Homophile League,
N.Y. Times, May 11, 1967, at 58, col. 2.
45. Editorial, The Washington Post. Feb. 2, 1971, editorial page.
46. City Hires Parolees in Change of Policy, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1967, at 1, col. 4.
47. Id.
Vol. 1971: 527]
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sion in New York City decided that suspected homosexuals could not
be barred from any job.4" The policy shift was made after two men,
suspected homosexuals, were denied jobs as caseworkers in the Depart-
ment of Welfare. Contending that they were not homosexuals, the two
sued in a federal district court, claiming an abridgement of due process
of law. In a settlement approved by the court-the case was not decided
on the merits-the Commission issued the following statement:
The City of New York does not have a policy of absolute disqualifica-
tion for homosexuality. The only exclusion it utilizes are those provisions
which authorize disqualification for either mental or physical disability or
for guilt of a crime or infamous or notoriously disgraceful conduct. Each
case of homosexuality is carefully examined to determine whether or not
it falls into any of these categories.
Policy dictates that with reference to a homosexual applicant, the com-
mission would be required to determine the personal qualities reasonably
considered indispensible to the duties of the position, and then to reasona-
bly determine whether the applicant's condition is inconsistent with the
possession of these qualities to the extent of rendering him untit to assume
the duties of the position.
. . .[a]n admitted homosexual, when the acts are frequent and recent
would not be qualified for the position of Correction Officer, whose duty
it would be to guard prisoners in one of the city penitentiaries.
Nor would such a person be probably qualified as a children's counse-
lor or playground attendant. .... 1
Since 1969, suspicion without proof should not bar employment in sensi-
tive city positions. However, the admitted or proven homosexual could
be, or even has a right to be, employed in city jobs not considered
sensitive.
Minorities, the Catholic, Jew, and Black, tend to be drawn to the city.
The homosexual also gravitates to the city, where employment oppor-
tunity is greater, to be with others with similar interests, and to "get
lost" in the huge and impersonal mass. As homosexuals surface and
become more militant, it is in the large city, in the main, that open action
is taken (as did the Catholic, Jew, and Black). New York, San Francisco
and Chicago today show more tolerance for the homosexual, a tolera-
tion slowly spreading to the government employer. Ultimately, the same
48. City Lifts Job Curb for Homosexuals. N.Y. Times, May 9, 1969. at I. col. 2.
49. Id. at 23, col. I.
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pressures will reach the private employer. New York, a minority battle-
ground, has always been the bellwether for avant garde legislation and
policy, subsequently followed elsewhere."
Federal employment is particulary important, not only because of the
mammoth bureaucracy, but because of the extensive publicity and its
snowballing influence. Following public opinion and religious influence,
the federal government has, to put it mildly, discouraged the employ-
ment of homosexuals, advancing the following reasons:
I. The practising homosexual violates local and state laws.
2. Homosexual love is immoral, condemned by religion and society.
3. Homosexuals are prone to blackmail.
4. Homosexuals are not emotionally stable.
5. Homosexuals exert a corrosive and undesirable influence upon fellow
employees, contaminating the government office.
6. Homosexuals are immoral.
7. Employing one homosexual means that others will be drawn. Thus,
the government must avoid becoming a "beehive" of homosexual activ-
ity.
8. Homosexuals are effeminate, always looking for playmates among
boys and young men.5
This standardized rationale merits comment. While the practicing
homosexual violates the criminal laws in most states, the accused is
presumed innocent until proven guilty. Even if guilt is established, people
who have served their sentence need employment. Furthermore, the het-
erosexual playboy violates state law without experiencing employer ran-
cor. Blackmailing would end if homosexuals were permitted to operate
openly. While some homosexuals are emotionally unstable, others are
well adjusted or no more emotionally disturbed than the heterosexual
employee.52 The homosexual cannot exercise a substantially corrosive
influence if society continues to find sexual inversion distasteful. Few
homosexuals are effeminate and an unwritten code of ethics may prevent
them from pursuing the young.53 In a nutshell, the reasons advanced by
50 For example. New York. in 1945, passed the first fair employment law. See 8 BNA FAIR
EMPLOYIE\T PRACTICE MANUAL 451:875 (1971).
51 S. Misc. Doc. No. 241, supra note 26, at 3-5.
52. Kinsey did not consider homosexuality as pathologic. See 1. BIEBER, HONIOSEXUALITY: A
PSYCHOANAIYTIC STUDY 304 (1962); see also Hooker, Male Homosexuality in the Rorschach, 22
J. OF PROJICIIVE TECHNIQUEs 33 (1958).
53. Discussions with members of the Mattachine Society, Los Angeles, April, 1971.
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government agencies to avoid hiring the homosexual are not, for the
most part, supported by fact or logic.
The United States Civil Service regulations provide that criminal,
immoral and disgraceful conduct are grounds for denying employment
or discharge.5 1 While those holding or applying for "insensitive" posi-
tions are not investigated in depth, they are discharged or not hired if
proof or even a whisper of homosexual behavior is uncovered. 5 As stated
in 1966 by Mr. Macy, chairman of the Civil Service Commission, "[i]f
an individual applicant were to proclaim publicly that he engages in
homosexual conduct, that he prefers such relationships, that he is not
sick or emotionally disturbed . . . the Commission would be required
to find such an individual unsuitable for federal employment.""6 Mr.
Macy further stated that "evidence showing. . . a person has homosex-
ual tendencies, standing alone, is insufficient to support a rating of
unsuitability on the ground of immoral conduct."57 This latter conten-
tion is difficult to square with actual practice.
Applicants for "sensitive" positions at the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion, Department of State, and Federal Bureau of Investigation, to men-
tion some, are thoroughly investigated, and homosexuals, actual or
suspected, are routinely excluded from employment."6 Emphasizing the
federal policy on hiring, the Subcommittee on Investigations for the
Committee on Expenditures concluded that "it should be borne in mind
that the public interest cannot be adequately protected unless responsible
officials adopt and maintain a realistic and vigilant attitude toward the
problem of sex perverts in the Government. To pussyfoot. . . will allow
some known perverts to remain in Government. . . ."I' In Appendix
III, the Subcommittee listed cases of reported sex perversion and few,
if any, involved posts or agencies vital to national security.,"
Substantial sums of money are spent each year by federal agencies to
investigate employees or prospects. After years of accumulation, the
Civil Service Commission, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other
54. Exec. Order No. 10450, 5 C.F.R. § 731.201 (April 27, 1953).
55. U.S. Homosexuals Gain in Trying to Persuade Society to Accept Them, Wall Street Journal,
July 17, 1968, at 1, col. 1.
56. Maddocks, The Homosexual and the Law, 34 SOCIAL AcTION 5, 11-12 (1967).
57. Id.
58. Parker, Homosexuals and Employment, at 8, in ESSAYS ON HOMOSEXUALITY, ESSAY No. 4
(1970).
59. S. Misc. Doc. No. 241, supra note 26, at 21.
60. Id. at 25.
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agencies are repositories for millions of dossiers, fountains of personal
information. Much of this information is unverified, based on allega-
tions of friends, acquaintances, enemies, experts, generalists, the knowl-
edgeable and unknowledgeable, etc. It is claimed that this hit-and-miss
type of information is vital to national security, and homosexuals and
companions are properly excluded from "sensitive" positions based on
this data.6" The local personnel officer and agency director are in a
position to bar "undesirables" without challenge.
Defections by homosexuals to foreign countries with vital data have
received considerable publicity. While some defectors were English citi-
zens, the incidents were widely publicized in this country, not only be-
cause of the sensationalism, but because of the need to press home the
point that the maintenance of vigilance is essential. William J. Vassall,
an acknowledged homosexual, was employed for many years by the
British Admiralty.6 2 After being photographed in Russia by Russian
agents while participating in a sexual orgy, Vassall was forced to supply
secret information. The press pointed out that Vassall was sent to Russia
in spite of his "gay" reputation.
Even more publicity was given to the defections to Russia by Guy F.
De M. Burgess and Donald D. Maclean, homosexuals employed in the
British Foreign Office."3 While Vassall's fear of exposure led to the
disclosure of confidential information, Burgess and Maclean were com-
munist sympathizers in college and willingly cooperated with the
Russian government; their homosexuality was not responsible for the
defections.
William H. Martin and Bernon F. Mitchell, alleged homosexuals
employed by the top-secret National Security Agency in the United
States, disappeared behind the Iron Curtain. 4
While caution is necessary when filling the "sensitive"
post -homosexuals and others can be persuaded to spy or defect-there
is less or no reason for denying employment to the professed but discreet
homosexual. What seems to determine government policy is not national
security but the general distaste for the homosexual. For example, the
Office of Economic Opportunity has refused, without legislative en-
61. Worsuop, HonosexualiIy: Morals and Security, in II EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS 505,
510-12 (1963).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 513-15.
64 Id. at510-12,
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dorsement, to employ homosexuals in the poverty program." To support
the ban, the Office of Economic Opportunity cited its need to secure
public support for the Job Corps.
The President and executive branch of government are authorized by
Congress to establish civil service regulations implementing legislation
calling for "efficiency." 66 The cornerstone of the federal legislation,
"efficiency," is a much abused and ill-defined term. To assure efficient
operation, the Civil Service Commission has taken an interest in the
suitability of the homosexual for federal employment, a specific unmen-
tioned by Congress in the enabling legislation. Congress also specified
that civil service employees cannot be terminated unless necessary to
promote "efficiency." 6
There is little doubt that Congress, being interested in men of "char-
acter," intended to bar the homosexual from federal employment. The
legislative call for federal "efficiency" and "character" is implemented
by the Civil Service regulation discouraging the employment of the
"[c]riminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral or notoriously disgrace-
ful." 8 Disqualifying the homosexual from employment because of
"inefficiency" is dubious unless broadly defined. Many homosexuals are
well-qualified for government employment and their ability to perform
satisfactorily on the job is unquestioned. Consequently, the Civil Service
interpretation expands the traditional concept of "efficiency." If the
homosexual affects the morale of other employees, their "efficiency"
can be impaired. Practicing homosexuals do not violate laws in some
states, but even there they are considered to engage in "immoral or
notoriously disgraceful conduct," which prevents federal employment."6
While some homosexuals are criminals, many lead a respectable life,
except for sex, according to prevailing heterosexual standards. In the
public eye, the homosexual is without "character," a position as old as
the Hebrew and Christian religions and followed by government agen-
cies. While "criminal" behavior and "character" are not cut from the
same legal cloth, the two concepts are intentionally interrelated when
considering hiring a homosexual.
65. Federal Job Corps to Exclude Youths Having Police Records, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1964,
at 30, col. 2.
66. 5 U.S.C. § 3301 (Supp. Iii, 1968).
67. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501(a) and 7512(a) (1967).
68. 5 C.F.R. § 731.201(b) (1971).
69. Id.
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The private life of a government employee, or any employee for that
matter, is entitled to protective shelter, whether for constitutional or
other reasons, unless his work suffers. If the homosexual does not "carry
on" in a federal facility (or, perhaps, publicly), the public interest in
monitoring his private life is not discernible (with the possible exception
of national security). The right to privacy has to be considered an essen-
tial goal, pierced only where a real, and not an imaginary, need exists.
On federal premises during working hours, the Civil Service Commis-
sion rightfully maintains vigilance, barring all play, heterosexual and
homosexual, and disruption. But this position is logical and fair only if
"straight" and "gay" employees are treated evenly when digressions
occur. Homosexuals cavorting in federal showers or bathrooms are un-
fairly punished for sexual play when the heterosexual offender is ignored.
A homosexual in ill-health is not entitled to federal employ-
ment-Congress authorized the Executive branch of government to set
"health" standards which can affect "efficiency. ' 70 The physical well-
being of all employees is of concern to the federal employer. However,
the "efficiency" of a homosexual is frequently challenged on the ground
of mental "health."'' 7 All homosexuals are believed to be mentally and
emotionally unbalanced and in need of psychiatric care, and some ana-
lysts support this view. 72 The mental "health" of the homosexual is
supposedly evaluated under the same standards as the "straight" em-
ployee, but in actual practice a dual standard operates. While the seri-
ously disturbed cannot effectively handle a job, the homosexual is often
under no greater emotional strain than the qualified "straight" em-
ployee; yet, the mental disequilibrium of the "gay" employee is presum-
ably greater than others.
High morale in the government office, essential to "efficiency," is an
elusive and much sought-after goal. Personnel directors, plying their
trade, seek to eliminate unnecessary disturbance, sponsor bowling
leagues, baseball and basketball teams, publish company magazines,
and reward the outstanding and long-time employee, all in the name of
capturing employee loyalty and improving morale. While the value of
these programs is difficult to measure-they disappear and reappear in
70 See note 66 supra.
71 Schlegel v. United States. 416 F.2d 1372 (Ct. CI.). cert. denied. 397 U.S. 1039 (1969);
Morrison v. Bd. of Educ.. I Cal. 3d 214.461 P.2d 375. 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969).
72. I. BILBER, HOmOSEXUALITY: A PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY 305-15 (1962).
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new forms-it is claimed without a shred of evidence73 that the homosex-
ual in the plant injures employee morale. Whether the homosexual nega-
tively affects the "efficiency" of other employees is a thesis that has not
been proven. If not effeminate and if unknown, the homosexual em-
ployee cannot dampen morale and efficiency. Effeminate employees are
not always homosexuals, a fact of life well-known to office employees
in particular. Whether "straight" or "gay," the effeminate employee
has been known to promote morale, the butt of good-natured (?) humor.
Where the "gay" habits of the employee are known-it is more likely
that they are suspect rather than known-there is some possibility that
morale will suffer and efficiency be impaired. But this possibility is
based on prejudice and ignorance rather than on hard information. Dis-
approval of the sex life of an employee does not always lead to a loss of
"efficiency." In fact, disapproval of an employee can lead to cohesive-
ness and pulling together of other employees that is otherwise absent.
With the increased sexual liberty characteristic in today's society, it
seems less likely that a homosexual today can disrupt morale to the
extent that he would have 50 or 100 years ago. Many government em-
ployees are college educated and less likely to be disturbed than those
with less education.
Inefficiency is tolerated in many government offices (and private
firms) and considerable effort is made to keep this "in the family." In
the large organization and particularly in white-collar employment, inef-
ficiency is not easily pinpointed and proving disruption because of a
known homosexual would be difficult. Congress, when it undertakes
budgetary allocation and appropriation, is far more damaging to em-
ployee morale than an entire squad of homosexuals working in a govern-
ment office. Anyone employed in a federal agency can testify to the
damage caused by newspaper reports speculating that budgets will be
cut, salary increases denied, etc. Yet, the Civil Service Commission
seems to view the negative impact upon public employees of budgetary
considerations as an unavoidable occupational hazard.
It is likely that easing the homosexual into public employment, free of
notoriety, will not threaten morale and efficiency; a more serious threat
is the public attitude. In fact, the hostility of the Civil Service Commis-
sion to employment of the homosexual may be due to what it perceives
73. Parker, Homosexuals and Employment, at 15, in ESSAYS ON HOMOSEXUALITY, ESSAY NO.
4 (1970).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss4/1
FAIR EMPLOYMENT
as the public attitude rather than other reasons advanced. If society is
reluctant to accept the homosexual as a federal employee, the Civil
Service Commission would be severely criticized in Congress and else-
where. It was recently stated that:
Some homosexual employees, in certain situations, are less likely to un-
dermine public confidence than are others. Public disapproval would
probably be less if the Commission failed to dismiss a homosexual em-
ployee with many years of meritorious service than if it accepted an
applicant. Homosexuals who restrict themselves to private acts are less
offensive than those indulging in open solicitation. Clandestine homosex-
uals are less likely to arouse public hostility than those who openly profess
their homosexuality. . . . The presence of homosexual employees in high
level positions. in jobs requiring extensive public contact, in new programs
apt to draw fire, or in rural areas with strong traditional values would be
more detrimental to public confidence than employment elsewhere. 7
Homosexuals or suspected homosexuals discharged from government
employment are, generally, unwilling to risk exposure by turning to the
courts for help. As a result, few homosexuals complain publicly. This
may be changing.7 5 The few cases which have come before a court will
now be reviewed. After a refusal of employment or removal from an
agency job, an appeal can be made to the Civil Service Commission and
the federal district court (or Court of Claims). However, there is no
right to petition the federal district court until the Civil Service Com-
mission makes a decision. 7
Few complaints are aired by the Civil Service Commission or the
courts. The "gay" employee, like his counterpart in the military, seeks
to avoid the publicity attending a grievance or court case and fails to
seek redress. The old legal fable that government employment is a privi-
lege and not a right, which means that the homosexual is not likely to
win by fighting his removal, also prevents a legal contest. Furthermore,
the doctrine of separation of powers among the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches of government spells reluctance on the part of judges
to question the hiring and retention policies of agencies. 7  While the legal
74. Note, Government-Created Employment Disabilities of the Homosexual 82 HARV. L. REV.
1738. 1745 (1969).
75. Schumach. On the Third Sex. N.Y. Times, May 7. 1967, § 4, at 5, col. I.
76. 27 FED. REG. § 550 (1960).
77. Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512. 515 (1920); Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290,
296 (1900).
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and constitutional rationale operating against the homosexual is cur-
rently in a state of transition and therefore the future course of events
difficult to forecast, legal changes are taking place. Treading softly but,
nevertheless, wielding a "big stick," courts have been hacking away at
the fairness of the procedure used by federal agencies and the Civil
Service Commission-the concept of procedural due process-rather
than questioning the substantive right of homosexuals to employment.18
From a public relations point of view, it is easier to convince society that
procedures must be fair than to protect the substantive right of the
homosexual to employment. What seems certain is that the tempo of
court involvement will increase in the future because of the Mattachine
Societies, Gay Liberation Party, and, less frequently, the American Civil
Liberties Union.
A comment is in order to clarify and or muddle the distinction made
between procedural and substantive due process of law. While these
concepts are tossed about as though clearly defined, as a practical matter
the distinction between procedural and substantive due process is some-
what fuzzy. For example, the Norris-La Guardia Act limiting the em-
ployer's use of the labor injunction is classified as a procedural law,
regulating the issuance of an injunction in a federal district court.79 As
a practical matter, the substantive rights of the union and the employer
are affected when an injunction is issued or refused. Should the federal
injunctive procedure apply in a state court hearing where the federal
substantive law controls? The homosexual who complains that his proce-
dural rights have been damaged by a federal agency, clutches at the
substantive right to hold a job and is often unconcerned with procedural
due process. Since the acceptance of Keynesian economics and the fed-
eral commitment to full employment, is there a substantive right-the
right of all homosexuals-to hold a government job? In essence, while
the court decisions are based upon procedural due process, the substan-
tive right of a homosexual to hold a government job is being determined.
Because the decisions are restricted to discussions of procedural due
process, it is difficult to evaluate the substantive changes that seem to
be taking place. Furthermore, until the Supreme Court fixes authorita-
tively the responsibility of government to employees, conflicting opin-
ions will emanate from state and federal courts. Attorneys representing
78. Anonymous v. Macy, 398 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub. nom., Murray v. Macy,
393 U.S. 1041 (1969).
79. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101 et. seq. (1964).
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homosexuals jockey for advantage and sue in jurisdictions favoring their
clients. Less favorable jurisdictions are bypassed when possible, and the
Supreme Court, in the not-too-distant future, is going to be involved (it
did agree to hear the Dew case, discussed infra, but an out-of-court
settlement was reached, rendering the issue moot"0 ).
Courts initially were unwilling to protect civil servants claiming a
constitutional denial of procedural due process.81 Even though the Civil
Service Act and the supplemental regulations contained procedural safe-
guards and an employee could only be discharged "for cause," the
courts refused to get involved, citing standardized generalities sometimes
irrelevant to the particular case to support their lack of interest.8 2 With
obvious reluctance, the federal courts began to look at claims made by
plaintiffs that the discharge was not "for cause," developing in the
process a philosophy that the government employer must act in good
faith, free of arbitrary or capricious decision-making.3 While the early
plaintiffs were not homosexuals, the door opened to permit the extension
of the same safeguards. This limited protection was not too meaningful
in the early stages because the courts would not question the judgment
of the agency finding "cause.""
The legal change was gradual, a rather typical course of development.
More and more government jobs opened, and local, state and federal
employers hired a sizeable portion of the total work force. While govern-
ment is small, its decisions cannot significantly affect prospective job-
holders and court scrutiny, under these circumstances, may be undesira-
ble. When government agencies hire large numbers of employees, a
80. Cert. granted, 375 U.S. 904. cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
8 1. Cafeteria Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Taylor and Marshall
v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1900); Bailey v. Richardson. 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950). affd, 341
US. 918 (1951); Lynch v. Chase, 55 Kan. 367, 40 P. 666 (1895); McAuliffe v. Mayor of New
Bradford. 155 Mass. 216. 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
82. 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (1967); Levy v. Woods. 171 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Culligan v. United
States, 107 Ct. Cl. 222 (1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 848 (1947); Golding v. United States, 78 Ct.
CI. 682, cert. denied. 292 U.S. 643 (1934); Levine v. Farley. 107 F.2d 186, 191 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
cert. denied. 308 U.S. 622 (1940).
83. Vigil v. Post Office Dept.. 406 F.2d 921 (10th Cir. 1969); Taylor v. Civil Service Comm.,
374 F,2d 466 (9th Cir. 1967); Brown v. Zuckert, 349 F.2d 461 (7th Cir. 1965). cert. denied, 382
U.S. 998 (1966); McTiernan v. Gronouski. 337 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1964); Pelicone v. Hodges, 320
F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
84. Bishop v. McKee, 400 F.2d 87, 88 (10th Cir. 1968); Studemeyer v. Macy, 321 F.2d 386 (D.C.
Cir. 1963), cert. denied. 382 U.S. 834 (1965); Eustace v. Day. 314 F.2d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Bailey
v Richardson. 182 F.2d 46. 62 (D.C. Cir. 1950). affd. 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
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laissez faire approach by the courts toward the executive branch of
government is less satisfactory.
In Dew v. Halaby,5 the plaintiff, after 20 months of satisfactory
service, was dismissed from the Federal Aviation Agency for past homo-
sexual acts. The plaintiff, when suit was brought, was 26 years of age,
married and a father, and the homosexual conduct had taken place when
he was 18 years of age. Because the Civil Service Commission reconsi-
dered and rehired the plaintiff, the Supreme Court dropped the case after
agreeing to hear it.
Dew, in terms of the broad issue, is not the best type of case to test
the public employment rights of a homosexual. As previously men-
tioned, homosexuality is more likely to occur in the young who tend to
outgrow this phase than in the mature person. The plaintiff was being
punished for conduct occurring in the past, without a claim that
wrongdoing occurred while an employee. There was, in addition, evid-
ence of a psychiatric examination indicating that the plaintiff was a well-
adjusted family man with no sign of reverting to past practices. All this
took place at a time when the Civil Service Commission claimed it did
not expel homosexuals with many years of service or fire employees held
guilty of minor crimes in the past.86
Since the plaintiffs efficiency rating was satisfactory, the government
could not claim inefficiency. Why was he discharged? Evidence was not
presented that the plaintiffs presence damaged morale; in fact, it is
unlikely that his fellow employees knew of his past. The plaintiff did not
fill a "sensitive" post and could not have been considered a security risk.
Even if classified as a security risk, an even-handed solution would be
to transfer the plaintiff to a less sensitive position. Was the agency
concerned with the need to maintain public confidence? If so, no evidence
to support such a possibility was presented. Yet the court of appeals
followed the decision of the Federal Aviation Agency and the Civil
Service Commission because evidence of a denial of due process was not
presented. A dismissal based on a charge totally unsupported by evi-
dence is a denial of procedural due process, allowing the court to avoid
consideration, if it sees fit, of the substantive employment rights of the
plaintiff. Since the law is in a transitional stage and stare decisis sup-
85. 317 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 375 U.S. 904, cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951
(1964).
86. Note, Government-Created Employment Disabilities of the Homosexual, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1738, 1744-46 (1969).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss4/1
FAIR EMPLOYMENT
ports the thesis that there is no right to a government job, tactically the
safest legal course is to find a denial of procedural due process (and not
substantive due process). But the court in Dew could not find any
government wrongdoing in 1963.87
Why was the plaintiff reinstated by the Civil Service Commission
after the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1964? It does not seem
likely that the federal government had shifted to a policy more favorable
to the plaintiff. What appears likely is that the Commission felt that its
decision could not be supported by any evidence and did not wish to risk
an upheaval of its policy which could protect other employees.
On the petition for review to the Supreme Court, the attorneys for the
plaintiff pointed to the Veterans' Preference Act which provides that
veterans can be discharged from federal employment to "promote...
efficiency. . . ." and for no other reason.8" Thus, the claim was made
that the issue was not the scope of judicial review but the meaning of
the Veterans' Preference Act. The rebuttal submitted by the respondent
was partially based on the notion that a court should not question the
judgment of an agency which decides that an employee is inefficient.89
But nowhere does the respondent submit evidence establishing the ineffi-
ciency of the plaintiff.
The same court of appeals decided Norton v. Macy, 0 where the plain-
tiff was discharged from his federal job for homosexual behavior. Pick-
ing up a hitchhiker in his automobile, the plaintiff invited him to his
apartment for a drink-to the stranger a sign of a homosexual advance.
The plaintiff was stopped by a police officer for exceeding the speed
limit, handed a traffic citation and released. Notified of the incident, the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration discharged the plain-
tiff. The plaintiff denied making a play for the stranger, but admitted
to homosexual tendencies in the past when under the influence of al-
cohol. The Civil Service Commission upheld the discharge of the plain-
tiff as an efficiency measure. 9 In court, the plaintiff claimed that there
was insufficient evidence to deduce that he had made a play for the
stranger and doubts were expressed that government "efficiency" would
be promoted by his discharge. Upsetting the legal "apple cart" and
87. Dew v. Halaby, 317 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
88. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, No. 36, Dew v. Halaby, 376 U.S. 904 (1964).
89. Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Certiorari at 9-10, Dew v. Halaby, 376 U.S. 904 (1964).
90. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
91. Id. at 1163.
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departing from the traditional position, the appellate court in Norton
ruled that it could review the government decision to determine whether
the plaintiff was discharged for good reason, substantiated by evidence."
Prior to Norton, courts were reluctant to challenge a discharge. 13 The
court carefully pointed out that the plaintiff did not hold a sensitive
position."
While the plaintiff admitted to homosexual tendencies when intoxi-
cated, the evidence was insufficient to conclude that a sexual advance
was made on the night of the plaintiff's arrest. The court, evidently, did
not consider past acts of homosexual behavior as evidence of a current
intent. Norton states that a homosexual cannot be thrown out of a civil
service job for past immoral behavior, even if admitted. While the evid-
ence to justify a discharge was inconclusive, the Civil Service Commis-
sion had not been criticized in the past for discharging admitted homo-
sexuals. The court of appeals seems to have taken the position that a
homosexual, at least in the absence of current indiscretion established
by acceptable evidence, has a right to federal employment. 5 However,
since the Civil Service Commission has indicated a reluctance to dis-
charge long-time employees and past indiscretions are ignored, the court
simply forced the government to follow established policy. Did the court
in Norton decide a procedural or substantive due process question?
The facts in Scott v. May96 are closer to Dew than Norton. In Norton,
the plaintiff admitted to a homosexual past and a future probability of
such acts when under the influence of alcohol. While there had been
indiscretion in the past, all evidence in Dew pointed to a total commit-
ment to heterosexual play in the near past and foreseeable future. The
Scott case went before the courts on two separate occasions. In Scott
I, the court of appeals, in a 2 to 1 decision, ruled in favor of the plaintiff
who had been disqualified from federal employment because an investi-
gation showed that he was a homosexual. However, no specific evidence
of homosexual activity was cited. The appellate court was concerned
with the ability of the plaintiff to secure public or private employment
92. Id. at 1165-67.
93. Note, Dismissal of Homosexuals from Government Employment: The Developmenting Role
of Due Process in Administrative Adjudications. 58 GEORGETOWN L.J. 632. 633-34 (1969-70).
94. 417 F.2d at 1166.
95. Id. at 1165-66.
96. 349 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
97. Id. and 402 F.2d 644 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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in the future. Thus, an applicant cannot be denied federal employment
or be discharged from his position without evidence of specific acts of
past homosexual behavior.98 To some extent, Scott I and Norton are
contradictory. Judge Bazelon, presenting the majority viewpoint in
Scott, also felt that the Commission must show that homosexuality
impairs efficiency. This is dictum because there was no evidence of
specific sexual acts.99 But in a concurring opinion Judge McGowan
differed, holding that the government was not required to establish inef-
ficiency. 10 There is an important difference between the viewpoints of
Judge Bazelon and Judge McGowan-homosexuals are entitled to a
federal job according to Judge Bazelon because it is unlikely that effi-
ciency would be impaired. Judge McGowan, on the other hand, holds
that an established homosexual is not entitled to federal employment
even if he is efficient.
Norton and May suggested increased court investigation in the future
of the right of an employer, public or private, to monitor the private life
of an employee. Judge Bazelon in both cases showed greater interest,
express or implied, in the right to privacy than in the government's
concern with sex. Dissenting Judge Burger in Scott I presented the tradi-
tional view that the judiciary should not meddle in executive affairs, that
efficiency is undermined because a homosexual can be blackmailed, and
the federal service should not be turned into a haven for the deviate.10'
Based on Scott I, the plaintiff was rehired and later discharged when
he failed to complete a questionnaire inquiring whether he was a homo-
sexual. Returning to the judicial battleground, the plaintiff sought rein-
statement. The government tried to avoid a consideration of the broad
issue, whether homosexuals could be refused public employment, by
claiming that the plaintiff was discharged for refusing to answer a proper
question. Supporting the plaintiff, the court felt that the plaintiff's fail-
ure to answer was used as a pretext to justify discharge for unproven
homosexual acts. 02 It would have been helpful if the court had decided
whether a job applicant could refuse to answer sexual questions. This
may be of particular significance in Oregon, Illinois and Connecticut
where homosexual acts are no longer a crime and the position can be
98. 349 F.2d at 184-85.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 185-86.
101. Id. at 187-89.
102. 402 F.2d at 647-48.
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taken that questions relating to sex are unjustifiable invasions of the
right to privacy.
In Vigil v. Post Office, 103 the plaintiff, working for the Post Office as
a janitor, was arrested and admitted engaging in a homosexual act in
the back seat of a car. He was convicted in Denver, Colorado, for
violating a local ordinance and was discharged from his job. While
claiming that he was drunk, the arresting officers said the plaintiff was
sober. The court mentioned Scott, but not Norton, distinguishing the
two cases on the basis of a vague versus a specific charge of homosexual
behavior and held that the Post Office rightly decided to discharge the
plaintiff."4 A concurring opinion said that the plaintiff was dismissed
because of a criminal conviction and not because of homosexuality."'
Balancing, a judicial art much practiced, is necessary when weighing
a claim of denial of due process. Walking the tightrope requires consid-
erable skill and knowledge, and not only is the plaintiff in need of pro-
tection, but there can be a vital public interest as well. It is difficult in
Dew, Norton, and Scott to show an overriding public interest. In none of
the cases did the plaintiff's homosexuality (or heterosexuality) affect
performance on the job. There was no evidence that the plaintiffs could
be blackmailed or that vital government information could be supplied if
blackmailed. Furthermore, husbands on the "prowl" and gamblers are
as subject to blackmail as the homosexual, and there is some question
as to whether federal agencies routinely rule out the employment of all
employees prone to blackmail.
Another practical approach has been officially unwrapped to protect
homosexuals in public employment. In Dew, Scott, and Norton, there
was no specific evidence of homosexual action of current vintage. But
in a case involving a University of Minnesota employee, the plaintiff
admitted that he was a practicing homosexual.' The plaintiff, a librar-
ian, was informally hired, and prior to formal acceptance by the Board
of Regents, applied for a license to marry a male student at the law
school. After a hearing and personal appearance before the Board of
Regents, the plaintiff was not hired. While admitting that he was a
homosexual, the plaintiff denied practicing sodomy, a crime in Minne-
sota. The Board conceded that the plaintiff was a competent librarian,
103. 406 F.2d 921 (10th Cir. 1969).
104. Id. at 924.
105. Id. at 925.
106. McConnell v. Anderson, 316 F. Supp. 809 (D. Minn. 1970), rev'd, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir,
1971).
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but that his admission to being a homosexual was tantamount to con-
fessing an act of sodomy, making him unfit for public employment. The
court carefully noted that the employment application used by the Uni-
versity of Minnesota did not ask prospective employees questions per-
taining to sex-i.e., the plaintiff did not lie-and a librarian cannot
injure national security."°7
Turning to Scott as precedent, the district court in McConnell took
the position that "an admission that one is a homosexual, standing alone
and without any evidence of any practice thereof will not justify the Civil
Service Commission (and the Board of Regents) in refusing to certify
him as eligible for employment based on a determination of 'immoral
conduct.' "'" But in Scott the plaintiff declared he was not a confirmed
homosexual, while in McConnell the plaintiff admitted being "gay" and
sought to marry another male. Thus, there is evidence clearly showing
that the plaintiff was and would continue as a practicing homosexual.
McConnell has to be interpreted as a decision that the established homo-
sexual is entitled to public employment. Unlike Vigil, the plaintiff in
McConnell had not been convicted of a crime.
The court in McConnell further noted that judges in the past had let
the government decide whether a job applicant was a homosexual, but
the challenge was proper on the question of procedural due process." 9
Expressly pointing to the shift in recent decision, the district court in
McConnell concluded that:
[T]he courts have abandoned the concept that public employment.., is
a mere privilege and not a constitutionally protected right . . . . Though
by current standards many persons characterize an homosexual as engag-
ing in "immoral conduct" . . . it seems clear that to justify dismissal
from public employment . . . it must be shown that there is an observable
and reasonable relationship between efficiency in the job and homosexual-
ity . . . . The Regents are of necessity speculating and presuming. Plain-
tiff's position will not expose him to children of tender years. . . . What
he does in his private life. . . should not be his employer's concern unless
it can be shown to affect in some degree his efficiency in the performance
of his duties . .. . l
The court was obviously referring to job performance as an efficiency
107. Id. at 812.
108. Id.
109. Id.
II0. Id.
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factor and not the possible impact of hiring a homosexual on employees
and the public. If the plaintiff was hired to work as a librarian in a
grammar or high school, the public authorities could rightfully refuse
employment. This rationale seems to be based on the unproven but often
claimed notion that the homosexual exercises an evil influence over
young boys and/or takes advantage of them sexually. In fact, there is
considerable feeling that the young take advantage of the mature homo-
sexual."'
It is difficult to evaluate the impact of McConnell, involving a public
librarian in contact with young and old. What if the plaintiff had been
hired to work in a university operated high school? Does the Minnesota
court imply that there would be a right to discharge under these circum-
stances? The court seemed satisfied that young people at a university
were less susceptible to influences than those of high school age. The
court took the same viewpoint as the New York City Civil Service
Commission." 2 This type of thinking, presently in the avant garde, still
reflects society's hostility to the homosexual who does not seek to spread
his lifestyle to the young. But this commonly held notion, formalized
into the decision-making process, handicaps the homosexual seeking
public or private employment.
The Minnesota court did not take the position that a homosexual was
entitled to public employment, but it supported constitutional proce-
dural protection; the plaintiff had "a right not to be discriminated
against under the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. ' '" 3 The
plaintiff was unquestionably seeking publicity by applying for a mar-
riage license as an exercise of the right of free speech-a point not
discussed by the court. The court issued an injunction under the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, forcing the Board of Regents to hire the plaintiff.
Because the plaintiff had moved to Minnesota, quitting his previous job,
there was no other adequate remedy, according to the court. It remains
possible that in another case, absent the publicity and unavailability of
another job, the court might award damages. Yet, the lower court in
McConnell seemed to go beyond this point.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the McConnell decision
on October 18, 1971, taking a more traditional position.' Starting with
I 11. Based on interviews with members of the Mattachine Society, Los Angeles, April, 197 1.
112. City Lifts Job Curb for Homosexuals, N.Y. Times, May 9, 1969, at 1, col. 2.
113. 316 F. Supp. at 814.
114. McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971).
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the premise that the Board of Regents for the University of Minnesota
has a right to control university affairs unless its actions are arbitrary
or capricous, the appellate court felt that the right of judicial review is
limited."15 The court noted:
[IIt is at once apparent that this is not a case involving mere homo-
sexual propensities . . . . Neither is this a case in which an applicant is
excluded from employment because of a desire clandestinely to pursue
homosexual conduct. It is instead . . . a case in which the prospective
employee demands . . . the right to pursue an active role in implementing
his unconventional ideas . ... We know of no constitutional fiat or
binding principle of decisional law which requires an employer to accede
to such extravagant demands .... "I
The court of appeals was concerned with the "activist role" and
"unconventional ideas", which certainly raise some important constitu-
tional issues. Does a public employer have a right to exclude employees
on these grounds?
Morrison v. State Board oJ Education17 falls factually between Dew
and McConnell. The plaintiff in Morrison, certified to teach in Califor-
nia high schools, was employed for some time without incident either in
or out of school. The plaintiff had no criminal record, although he
admitted to a homosexual problem at the age of 13. While counseling a
fellow teacher experiencing marital difficulty, the plaintiff and colleague
engaged in homosexual play upon four occasions. Six years passed since
the incidents occurred and the plaintiff asserted that he had not engaged
in homosexual play since then. The California law makes sodomy, fella-
tio, solicitation, loitering near public toilets, and exhibitionism illegal,
but other forms of homosexual play are not outlawed."'
Citing immoral conduct as the reason," the Board of Education in
Morrison revoked the plaintiff's permit to teach in California. Califor-
nia law provides for the revocation of a teaching license without a hear-
ing if one is convicted of a designated sexual crime, 20 but a hearing must
be held if there is no conviction. The California Supreme Court, with
I1S. Id. at 195.
116. Id. at 196.
117. I Cal. 3d 214.461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969).
118. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 286. 288a. 314, 647 (1971).
119. The court in Morrison decided that there is no clear cut distinction between "immoral"
and "unprofessional" conduct, reasons for revoking a teaching certificate.
120. The constitutionality of such a proviso is doubtful.
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Justice Tobriner writing the majority opinion, reversed the lower courts
in favor of the plaintiff, holding that what is tabbed "immoral" must
be judged on a case-to-case basis. 2' Following Norton, Justice Tobriner
felt that acts labeled "immoral" in the past are not necessarily "immo-
ral" today. Not only was the conduct of the accused homosexual to be
considered, but Justice Tobriner felt, a la Norton, that a court can
review the decision of a state agency. Furthermore, the court in
Morrison, again following Norton, ruled that "[t]he private conduct of
a. . .teacher, is a proper concern of those who employ him only to the
extent" that his teaching is impaired, emphasizing the right to privacy. 22
Based on Norton and Morrison, a local and federal employee accused
of homosexuality is protected to the following extent:
1. Homosexuality alone is not sufficient reason to justify, with or with-
out a hearing, exclusion from a government job.
2. Decisions made by state and federal agencies are reviewable to assure
fair play. part of procedural due process.
3. The conduct in private of a public employee does not bar employment
unless his performance on the job is affected.
Not only do concepts of immorality change but different groups hold
different views. For this reason, courts review decisions made by admin-
istrative agencies which are prone to political pressure. However, Justice
Tobriner may not have been on solid ground when he went on to say
"[w]e cannot believe that the Legislature intended to compel disciplinary
measures against teachers who committed such peccadillos if such con-
duct did not affect students or fellow teachers .... 1113 Given the typi-
cal legislative attitudes, it is doubtful whether job protection was in-
tended for the homosexual.
Taking a position more extreme than the lower court in McConnell,
the majority in Morrison said that the following factors should be con-
sidered when weighing morality:
I. Effect of conduct on students and teachers.
2. Whether the misconduct is of recent vintage.
3. "Type of teaching certificate held by the accused.
4. Presence or absence of extenuating circumstances.
5. Likelihood of reoccurrence.
121. I Cal. 3d at 220, 461 P.2d at 379, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
122. Id. at 224, 461 P.2d at 382, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
123. Id. at 225, 461 P.2d at 383, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
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6. The possible chilling effect of punishment on the constitutional rights
of teachers.' 21
Judge Tobriner enunciated criteria concerning teachers but the same
criteria could apply to other kinds of government employment.
An interesting point in California and other states is the so-called
"expunge" statute designed to protect the ex-convict. Under the Califor-
nia statute, a defendant sentenced to probation may, after completion
of his probation period, secure from the court the dismissal of the
charges against him, "and he shall thereafter be released from all penal-
ties and disabilities resulting from the offense of which he has been
convicted . . ."12 In Taylor v. U.S. Civil Service Commission, 21 the
plaintiff, employed by the Air Force, was discharged as an "efficiency"
measure when two past convictions of the vagrancy-lewd law in Califor-
nia were uncovered. The plaintiff claimed that his prior convictions had
been expunged under the California law, and he was, currently, "not
guilty." The Civil Service Commission ruled that the two prior convic-
tions were evidence of immoral conduct and justified the plaintiff's dis-
charge. According to the Federal Court of Appeals, expunging the prior
conviction did not establish innocence and the discharge was not capri-
cious; the character of an employee can be determined by past convic-
tions as they bear on current "efficiency."'127
Federal jobs and administrative procedures are not controlled by state
law, so it may not be necessary to follow a state law. However, the
appellate court in Morrison did not consider this possibility, and the
decision seems to stand for the proposition that an ex-convict, at least
one held guilty of a sex crime, is not protected when denied a federal
job in the name of "efficiency." The decision smacks of double jeop-
ardy, imprisonment and subsequent economic punishment. In Norton,
the court held that homosexuality is not the equivalent of "inefficiency"
and Dew states that the past is irrelevant. Should the same result be
reached if an ex-convict and an expunging statute are involved?
Courts differ and cases are distinguished on the basis of fact, but the
prevailing opinion today is that past acts of homosexuality, standing
alone, and general charges of wrongdoing, unsubstantiated by specific
evidence, do not justify the discharge of a public employee. 28 Because
124. Id. at 229, 461 P.2d at 386, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
125. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (1961).
126, 374 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1967).
127. Id. at 469-70.
128. Vigil v. Post Office Dept.. 406 F.2d 92 (10th Cir. 1969); Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161
(D.C. Cir. 1969); Schlegel v. United States, 416 F.2d 1372 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Scott v. Macy, 402 F.2d
644 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Scott v. Macy, 349 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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the public considers the homosexual immoral, it can be anticipated that
some courts will search for reasons to justify discharge.
One means of keeping the homosexual from a public job is to ask, on
the employment questionnaire, whether he is "gay." Homosexuals have,
in the past, refused to supply this information or lied. If the applicant
refuses to respond, the courts would probably uphold the right of a
government agency to this infomation even though irrelevant to effi-
ciency and an invasion of privacy. In Scott H, the information was
sought after the plaintiff was discharged, indicating an intent to exclude
the homosexual . 2 But if sex information is requested prior to employ-
ment, the homosexual cannot refuse to answer unless there is a constitu-
tional violation of the right to privacy.
Should the homosexual lie and deny his "gay" qualities, he is suscep-
tible to discharge. Yet society forces the homosexual to lie-to admit
that he is "gay" means economic suicide and the possibility of criminal
prosecution.
Homosexuals are arrested and/or convicted for "gay" crimes. If they
truthfully admit conviction, they will not be hired. If they lie, they can
be discharged for supplying false information. It seems that fair employ-
ment legislation will be necessary, preferably at a federal level, to protect
the homosexual from employment discrimination.
National Security
In 1953, President Eisenhower issued Executive Order 10450 to pro-
tect the national security. 3 " As could be anticipated, the security-risk
category was broadly defined to include homosexuals, immoral people,
felons, etc., all of whom were declared to be unsuitable employees. As a
result of the decision in Greene v. McElroy, '3 the 1953 rules were de-
clared invalid by the Supreme Court because the person seeking security
clearance was inadequately protected.
The current rules, issued in 1960 by President Eisenhower as Executive
Order 10865, reiterated the need for screening in positions affecting the
national security and established broad safeguards for the person seek-
ing job clearance. 32 Implementing Executive Order 10865, the Depart-
ment of Defense issued Directive 522.06 in 1960, protecting the jobholder
129. 402 F.2d at 645-46.
130. 18 FED. REG. § 2489 (1953).
131. 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
132. 25 FED. REG. § 1583 (1960).
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handling classified information unless inconsistent "with the national
interest."' 33 While the national interest was not sublimated for the pro-
tection of the jobholder, the executive branch of government did estab-
lish the policy that the individual was entitled to some consideration. Of
course, what is not "clearly consistent with the national interest" was
not spelled out. Homosexuals were denied security clearance before and
after 1960, by what is tantamount to a per se rule, because they partici-
pated in criminal or immoral conduct and were easy prey for the black-
mailer.
An incident reported in the New York Times typifies the treatment
accorded the homosexual under the 1960 regulations. 34 A young soldier,
an admitted homosexual, carried an address book with the name of
Benning Wentworth, a federal employee. Queried about his association
with the soldier, Wentworth said that the former, while a civilian, made
a pass at him which was rejected. Wentworth was discharged after his
security clearance was taken away, a discharge which appears contrary
to the holding in Norton. However, Wentworth admitted to being a
homosexual, perhaps a fact distinguishing this case and Norton.
Schlegel v. U.S. 31 involved the plaintiffs loss of his civilian job with
the Army, a job that did not entail the handling of classified informa-
tion, after his security clearance was refused for an occasional fill-in job
as a duty officer handling top secret messages. An investigation for
clearance uncovered that the plaintiff had on a number of specific occa-
sions participated in homosexual acts. One reason cited by the plaintiff
to support his quest for job reinstatement, but not security clearance,
was that the federal guidelines were violated. The guidelines provide:
(2) Misconduct while off duty does not, in itself, serve as a basis for
removal. There must be a showing that the misconduct affected the em-
ployee's performance. . . or the specific manner in which the misconduct
reflected discredit upon the . . . Army . . . or the manner in which the
misconduct was otherwise detrimental to the efficiency of the service. 136
Key terminology protecting the jobholder is "[t]here must be a show-
ing," whatever that means, of factors affecting the efficiency of or dis-
crediting the military service. Since misconduct alone is not grounds for
release from employment and the plaintiff was a veteran honorably
133. 25 FED. REG. 14392 (1960).
134. N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1967, at 70. col. 3.
135. 416 F.2d 1372 (Ct. CI. 1969).
136. C.P.R. S. 1.3-3c (2).
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discharged from the military service, there had to be a "showing" that
removal would promote efficiency.
While the various levels of hearing boards concluded that the plain-
tiff's efficiency had been impaired, the court refused to determine
whether the evidence supported such a conclusion.3 7 Since Department
of Defense Directive 522.06 requires that the showing be made
"clearly," it seems that tangible evidence must be produced to support
the conclusion that efficiency was impaired. Schlegal can be viewed,
because of the court's reluctance or inability to point to specific evidence
of an impairment of efficiency, as support for the proposition that clear
evidence is unnecessary. Instead, the court doted upon the three who
testified that efficiency and morale would have been negatively affected,
a future possibility, unless the plaintiff was discharged. 3 The testimony
relied upon were conclusions unsupported by fact, hardly squaring with
the Defense Department directive calling for clear evidence. The court
then proceeded to cite the legal position that the decision of an adminis-
trative agency, absent a showing of a lack of good faith, could not be
reviewed. 139
Schlegel and Norton can be distinguished on the basis of jobs requir-
ing security clearance and those that are not "sensitive." Yet this dis-
tinction is unrealistic, not only because the plaintiff in Schlegel was
denied job clearance, but because he lost his non-sensitive post. In addi-
tion, the court in Schlegel claimed a distinction-in Norton there was
only one unsubstantiated act of homosexuality, while a series of "gay"
acts were established in Schlegel.' As a point of departure, in Norton
the court ruled that it could evaluate administrative conclusions, to
determine whether they were supported by evidence,' while in Schlegel
the court decided that it was not authorized to go beyond the conclusion.
Evidently, if there is some evidence to support the finding of homo-
sexuality, the court was unwilling to question whether efficiency was
impaired.
The concurring judges in Schlegel emphasized the need for security
137. 416 F.2d at 1378.
138. Id. at 1374.
139. Id. at 1375.
140. Id. at 1378.
141. 417 F.2d 1161, 1164-65 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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precautions and the possibility that the Army would face public ridicule
if the plaintiff was not fired. One of the concurring judges stated:
An agency is not necessarily wrong if it deems that good public rela-
tions favor efficiency. and that bad ones detract from it . . . Nor is it
absurd to fear that a public which loses respect for the employees of an
agency will lose respect for the agency itself. 112
Since the majority opinion did not establish injury to efficiency, the
concurring judge tied efficiency to public respect, a concept difficult to
support in light of standard definition.
The public and private employee can affect the national security. In
Adams v. Laird,' the plaintiff, employed by a private employer as an
electronics technician, enjoyed security clearance for seven years. Be-
cause of a subsequent denial of "Top Secret" clearance on the ground
of homosexuality, the plaintiff also lost his lower level security clearance.
There was evidence in Adams that the plaintiff had been a practicing
homosexual all of his adult life, a distinguishing factor from Norton.
While the plaintiff did not deny his homosexuality, contrary to Norton,
he argued that clearance cannot be denied unless there is a clear and
present danger to the government, which was not established. The court
refused to adopt the plaintiffs position because the President can set
standards for jobs affecting national security in the absence of a consti-
tutional infringement.'44
Since the plaintiff held a security clearance for seven years without
incident, the likelihood that the plaintiff was a security risk was small.
Since the risk may be greater in the "Top Secret" category, there may
be greater need to respect the administrative decision. There may be less
reason to support the administrative decision at the lower level of clear-
ance. The dissenting judge favored remand "for a determination of the
relationship between the . . . homosexual conduct and the ability of
appellant to protect classified information" and "[g]eneralized assump-
tions that all homosexuals are security risks certainly cannot outweigh
almost eight years of faithful service," a denial of due process and a bill
of attainder.'
It should be borne in mind that the heterosexual has been far more
frequently involved in espionage than the homosexual, and it is doubtful
142. 416 F.2d at 1383.
143. 420 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
144. Id. at 235-36.
145. Id. at 240-41.
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that this is due to screening. Irvin Scarbeck turned secret documents
over to his Polish mistress; Judith Coplon gave secret data to her Rus-
sian lover; Elizabeth Bentley, a confessed spy, admitted her love for a
Communist agent, etc."' The preoccupation with the homosexual as a
security risk seems unjustified, especially since he seldom holds a job in
which he has access to vital information.
The Taft-Hartley Act
Neither the Civil Rights Act of 1964 nor the Taft-Hartley Act men-
tions the homosexual. Although the former does not protect an employee
from employment discrimination based on his homosexuality, the latter
may offer some measure of protection. The Taft-Hartley Act does not
cover public employees, and no cases have been found pertaining to the
homosexual as a private employee; nevertheless, it could prove useful as
a fair employment tool. Drawing an analogy, nothing in the Act or in
the legislative hearings suggested that Blacks were entitled to protec-
tion from racial discrimination by an employer or union, but the influ-
ence of the Supreme Court and the shift in public opinion led the NLRB
into the battle. Looking at the requirement of fair representation by a
union 117 and the definitions of unfair labor practices, 4 ' the NLRB and
courts were able to extend some protection to the black employee. It is
within the realm of possibility that the NLRB, faced with a legitimate
question of fair representation or an unfair labor practice, might extend
a helping hand to the homosexual. Such a move may be timely, based
on the recent cases in federal courts involving public employees.
According to the Taft-Hartley Act, a job applicant can be turned
away or an employee discharged by an employer for any reason other
than to hit at a union.' Based on this position, an employer can lawfully
discharge or refuse to hire a homosexual. However, the discharge of a
"gay" employee presents a situation in which the NLRB could be by-
146. Parker, Homosexuals and Employment, in ESSAYS O, HOMOSEXUALITY, ESSAY No. 4
(1970). Other cases of heterosexual espionage are reported therein at 18-19.
147. Syres v. Oil Workers Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955).
148. Hughes Tool Co., 147 NLRB 1573 (1964); Local 1367, Longshoremens Union. 148 NLRB
897 (1964); Local 12, Rubber Workers Union, 150 NLRB 312 (1964).
149. Indiana Metal Products Corp. v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1953); Farmers Co-
Operative Co., 102 NLRB 144, rev'd, 208 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1953); American Bottling Co.. 99
NLRB 345 (1952), affd, 205 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1953). cerl. denied, 346 U.S. 921 (1954); Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 200 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1952); NLRB v. W.C. Nabors Co., 89 NLRB
538 (1950), affd, 196 F.2d (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 865 (1952); South Jersey Coach
Lines, 89 NLRB 1260 (1950).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss4/1
FAIR EMPLOYMENT
passed in favor of arbitration. A large majority of collective bargaining
agreements provide that an employee cannot be discharged except for
"'just cause," culminating in arbitration under an "all disputes" provi-
sion. The "just" discharge of a "gay" employee could be brought be-
fore an impartial arbitrator. providing the union requests arbitration. 150
Is an employee justly discharged because he is gay?
Whether arbitration constitutes a viable alternative to fair employ-
ment legislation is speculative. Union members and leaders hold little
sympathy for the homosexual, as does society in general, and if an
employer decides to discharge him, it is unlikely that the union will
request arbitration. Unless the union acts in bad faith or engages in
unfair representation, the homosexual cannot put the question of a
"just" discharge before an arbitrator.'-" It is doubtful whether a court
would intervene and order arbitration when a union fails to protect a
homosexual. Yet, the failure to request arbitrarion could be viewed as
discrimination, an unfair labor practice, or unfair representation.
The importance of bringing this issue before an arbitrator cannot be
minimized. Arbitrators have shown greater interest in protecting the
employee from discharge than the employer in deciding what is "just
cause," and the homosexual, even with a criminal record, may be enti-
tled to his job. Discharge is the capital punishment of the industrial
world, and arbitrators are reluctant to impose this penalty, especially for
the long-term employee. More and more arbitrators take the position
that the employer has no right to look into the private life of an em-
ployee.5 2 Few employers bother to punish the heterosexual offender,
except for rape, and the arbitrator must take this dual standard into
account when rendering an opinion involving the homosexual. Once
again, an important consideration is getting the union to request that the
discharge be submitted to arbitration.
Suppose an employer wishes to hire or retain a homosexual and the
union demands his discharge. While the arbitration process generally
accommodates the employee and union, the employer can also request
arbitration. Admittedly, few employers "buck" a union by resorting to
arbitration.
The employer is not obligated to succumb to the wishes of the union
150. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967): Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills. 353 U.S. 448
(1957).
151. Vaca v. Sipes. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
152. Kovarsky. DischargesJor Events Occurring,.Iwayfrom Work, 13 LABOR L.J. 374 (1962).
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and turn away the homosexual employee. Where an employee is not
required to join a union as a condiion for employment, the union,
technically speaking, has no control over the work force under the Taft-
Hartley Act. In the absence of a legitimate union-security proviso in a
collective bargaining agreement, the union is without legal interest in the
employer's work force. Where a union-security clause is contracted, a
union cannot pressure the employer to discharge an employee except for
the non-payment of initiation fees and dues.' Consequently, manage-
ment is in a position to hire the homosexual employee irrespective of the
desires of a union.
Yet, it seems unlikely that the employer will react any differently to
a homosexual than a union member or leader. By subtle and not so
subtle union and employee pressures, the employer willing to hire the
"gay" employee could be forced to change hiring practices. Interested
in maximizing profits and efficiency in the plant and concerned with his
public image, the typical employer will not retain the homosexual em-
ployee. It is at this point that the homosexual is without any social or
legal support.
An analogy is in order. Employers, before the passage of the Federal
Fair Employment Bill, claimed that they were willing to hire and pro-
mote blacks, but union pressure prevented fair employment. Thus, a fair
employment bill was necessary to attack unions practicing discrimina-
tion. "' By the same token, employers willing to hire the homosexual will
need legal aid to counteract union pressure.
An examination of the decisions involving other types of discharge
reveals what the homosexual can anticipate. The plaintiff, constantly
quarreling with other employees and negatively affecting morale, was
discharged by his employer. 5 The plaintiff was a bush pilot flying over
wilderness, and the court, upholding an arbitrator's decision supporting
the discharge, noted that employee morale was an important factor in
safety. Since the collective bargaining agreement provided for arbitra-
tion, the employer requested the arbitrator to decide whether the dis-
charge was proper. To justify discharging a homosexual, an employer
could claim, as in the public employment cases, that morale is negatively
affected, a justification that may be acceptable to an arbitrator. Yet, it
is doubtful whether a homosexual seriously affects morale, and most
153. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1971).
154. Kovarsky, The Negro and Fair Employment, 56 Ky. L.J. 757, 775-95 (1968).
155. Farris v. Alaska Airlines, 113 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Wash. 1953).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss4/1
FAIR EMPLOYMENT
jobs held by homosexuals (and others) cannot affect the safety of others.
An employee was discharged for gambling and booking bets on his
employer's premises. 56 The employee was charged with committing a
felony, later reduced to a misdemeanor, and fined by the criminal court.
Submitting the discharge to arbitration under the "just cause" provision
of the collective bargaining agreement, the union claimed that the pen-
alty was too severe. The collective bargaining agreement gave the em-
ployer the right to discharge any employee violating "any penal law,"
and the employer claimed that he was exercising his contractual right.
But the agreement also provided that an employee who gambled would
be subjected to "relatively mild punishment." Finding that the penalty
imposed was too harsh and that conflicting contractual clauses were
applicable to the offense, the arbitrator ordered the employer to reinstate
the employee." 7
Disagreeing with the decision, the employer refused to reinstate the
employee, claiming that the arbitrator exceeded his authority and the
punishment was necessary to protect his public image.' 8 The court sup-
ported the arbitrator, citing the Supreme Court decision in Enterprise
Wheel & Car Co.,'59 and noted the employee's long service, efficiency,
the greater public tolerance for gambling than in the past, and that the
contract authorized "relatively mild punishment." The court also con-
sidered that "employment plays an important role in implementing the
public policy of rehabilitating those convicted of [a] crime which over-
rides any [employer's] policy of precluding reinstatement. ... 110
Whether the rationale expressed by the court applied to a homosexual
accused or convicted of a misdemeanor or felony is speculative. If he is
efficient, and the public is more tolerant today of the homosexual, the
same rationale can be applied in the absence of a contractual clause
granting the employer the right of discharge for homosexuality. While
the public is more tolerant of gambling than homosexuality, would the
employer's public image be tarnished by extending employment? Would
morale and efficiency in the plant be hindered by employing a known
homosexual? At least in some industries, like theatre, music, and hair-
dressing, it would not be advantageous for the employer to establish a
negative impact upon plant efficiency and good will.
156, Machinists Union, Dist. #8 v. Campbell Soup Co., 406 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1969).
157. Id. at 1226.
158, Id.
159. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
160. 406 F.2d at 1227.
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In Photoswitch, Inc.,"1 an employee of ten years standing concealed
a conviction for larceny from his employer. The employer, discovering
the criminal record, discharged the employee during a period of union
organization. The NLRB ordered reinstatement because the employee
was not discharged for concealing a criminal record but for favoring
union organization, a violation of section 8(a)(3). The Board noted that:
1. The conviction occurred more than ten years ago and since then the
employee was "clean."
2. The employee worked at a naval depot during wartime, cleared by the
F.B.I.
3. The employer did not always follow his enunciated policy of discharg-
ing employees with a criminal record.
Could the same rationale be used to support the employment rights of
a homosexual with a criminal record? 62 Would this approach be particu-
larly valid in states like California with an expungement statute or in
Connecticut, Illinois and Oregon (that a federal and not a state law is
involved is acknowledged)?
Collective bargaining agreements are negotiated authorizing unions to
operate as exclusive job placement agents for employers. Called a "hir-
ing hall," such agreements are valid under the Taft-Hartley Act if union
and non-union job applicants are referred without discrimination. 6 ' The
question raised is whether a union operating a "hiring hall" can legiti-
mately refuse to refer a homosexual. In construction and printing,
considerable use is made of the "hiring hall," and referrals can be
important to the homosexual. No cases are reported where referral was
refused to a homosexual, so that the answer is speculative. But unions
have refused to make referrals for other reasons and these decisions may
be applicable.
Several members of the National Maritime Union were refused refer-
ral after being convicted of narcotic charges.'64 It should be pointed out
161. 99 NLRB 1366 (1952).
162. For other cases involving the discharge of an employee with a criminal record, see Elder-
Beerman Stores, Inc., 173 NLRB 566 (1968); Alterman Transport Lines, 173 NLRB 434 (1968);
Sanitary Laundry and Dry Cleaning Co.. 171 NLRB No. 123 (1968); Atlantic Co., 79 NLRB 820
(1948).
163. Local 357, Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
164. Figueroa v. Nat. Maritime Union. 55 L.R.R.M. 2743 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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that in the Dew case previously reviewed, the plaintiff, when younger,
had smoked marijuana. The district court in Dew said:
There is no doubt ...that a person who smokes marijuana cigarettes
...shows a dangerous weakness of character. Likewise, a person who
has engaged in sexual deviation in the form of homosexuality shows cer-
tain weakness of character. so to speak. Both [of] these weaknesses of
character affect a person's reliability. 65
After the General Counsel, in the case involving the Maritime union,
failed to uncover evidence supporting an unfair labor practice charge
under sections 8(b)(l) (A) and (2), the plaintiffs petitioned the federal
district court for relief under sections 101(a)(5) and 102 of the Landrum-
Griffin Act." 6 The court of appeals, reversing the district court, favored
the union, ruling that it was not obligated to refer those convicted of
violating the narcotics laws.6 7 Homosexuality and the use of narcotics
pose some difficulty in the maritime industry, where the "hiring hall"
is widespread, and judicial sympathy for the right of a union to refuse
placement can be anticipated. However, if the conviction was in the past,
should persecution continue? Should the "gay" person not convicted of
a crime be refused referral?
The questions raised in this section may be academic. The musicians
union operates a "hiring hall" in many cities, and it has shown little
interest in the sex life of its members. Based upon an examination of
confidential data provided by the Mattachine Society of Los Angeles,
few homosexuals seek blue collar employment or the type of job where
a "hiring hall" is used. 6 ' Consequently, while the homosexual needs
employment protection, neither the Taft-Hartley Act nor the Landrum-
Griffin Act appear to lend much support.
The Homosexual and Private Employment
The availability of confidential data highlighting the employment dif-
ficulties of the homosexual in private industry is limited. Sampling is not
helpful because many homosexuals wish to remain anonymous and ran-
dom contact is not useful. Information is not available through reliable
165. Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Certiorari at 6, Dew v. Halaby, 376 U.S. 904 (1964),
quoting the unreported opinion of the District Court.
166. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401 et. seq. (1971).
167. Figueroa v. Nat. Maritime Union. 342 FP2d 400 (2d Cir. 1965). For a similar decision, see
Paige v. Nat. Maritime Union, 63 L.R.R.M. 2505 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
168. See Table I infra.
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academic channels. Unpublished information, admittedly of limited
value, was made available by the Mattachine Society, Los Angeles, and
the Gay Activist Alliance (G.A.A.), New York City. The available in-
formation will now be reviewed.
The Los Angeles study was initiated in 1960 and only 388 homosex-
ual's responses were accepted by the Mattachine Society. While the in-
formation supplied is dated, it is doubtful that significant changes have
taken place. The difficulty of evaluating these responses cannot be un-
derestimated. Some were lengthy, others short; some were related to the
question, other answers were irrelevant; some were well-written while
others show low-level verbal skills; some disclosed considerable sensitiv-
ity while others indicated a lack of insight, etc. Pertinent information,
such as the reception accorded the known homosexual by the employer,
degree of acceptance if any, and the responsibility of the homosexual for
some of his employment problems, was unavailable.
Based on information supplied by the G.A.A., the homosexual faces
considerable discrimination in both public and private employment.
Because "gay" employees hide their sex preferences and many are not
noticeable, little employment discrimination is reported in relation to the
general condemnation of the homosexual. Where homosexuals are read-
ily spotted or known, it seems fair to assume that they will face consider-
able employment discrimination.
Gathering data of value presents considerably greater difficulty than
coaxing a response. Even the definition of a homosexual poses a chal-
lenge. For example, when is an adult a confirmed and practicing homo-
sexual? In the questionnaires examined in Los Angeles, 76 reported a
heterosexual marriage and 47 of these unions resulted in children. Be-
cause some marriages are contracted to further careers and to assure
anonymity, the homosexual is difficult to identify. While the Kinsey
report states that four percent of our total population are hard core
homosexuals,'69 a considerably larger percentage of the male population
are bi-sexual and difficult to identify. Furthermore, when is one a con-
firmed homosexual--when male sex is preferred 30, 50, 70, 80, or 100
percent of the time?
Studies made of the homosexual are often unfair not only because of
the inability to resort to sampling technique, but because society judges
him by the parading "queen," those criminally charged with molesting
169. See note 14 supra.
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or influencing children, and psychiatrists who classify all homosexuals
as mentally disturbed people. The studies published by psychiatrists,
clinical psychologists and criminal investigators are not based on ran-
dom sampling; yet, they are viewed as representative of the homophile
community.
The data tabulated in Table I reflects the employability of the homo-
sexual and not the attitude of the employer. It is apparent that the
educational level of the 388 reported homosexuals was considerably
above the national average. The median years of schooling was 15.1
compared to 10.6 for the general population in 1960. 10 Two hundred and
six reported holding college degrees, including 51 Masters of Arts de-
grees and 30 Doctorates, a considerably larger percentage than the na-
tional average. A more complete survey of the educational level of the
homosexual would probably be less favorable; the average years of
schooling is probably less than herein indicated because of the number
of responses that were not tabulated. Also, the more educated person is
more likely to respond than the person with less education.
The level of education neither speaks for nor against the native intel-
ligence or ability of the homosexual. Rather, the massive dose of educa-
tion may be attributed to ostracism, thus forcing him to live an inward
life. In addition, the homosexual probably finds greater acceptance on
the college campus than elsewhere, drawing him to the "sheltered" life.
Another factor is the inability of some heterosexual males to support
a family while pursuing a college education. Since the committed homo-
sexual does not raise a family, he is financially able to continue his
schooling. But this explanation may be of limited value because of the
availability of scholarships, the G.I. Bill, day-care centers for children,
and the "pill".
The educational level of the homosexual points to his concentration
in better than average jobs at a salary exceeding that of the average wage
earner. In short, there seems to be a positive correlation between educa-
tion, occupation, and income. Columns 2 and 3 of Table I point to the
economic success of the reporting homosexual and suggest that he does
not face employment discrimination. This, of course, is untrue. The
"gay" employee may be concentrated in occupations where he faces less
discrimination or, more likely, his sex preferences are unknown.
170. U S. BUR. OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1962, at 117,
table 148 (83rd ed.).
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The percentage of homosexuals in the professional, technical, mana-
gerial, and fine arts categories is high. Yet, as previously mentioned, this
does not indicate an absence of employment discrimination. In an un-
published report prepared by the G.A.A., entitled "Employment Dis-
crimination Against Homosexuals," Supplement #1, issued on February
3, 1971, and presented to the New York City Commission on Human
Rights, the employment problems of the homosexual, even in occupa-
tions presumed to be relatively free of discrimination, were reported.
For example, the report indicated that the Columbia Broadcasting
System, which denied discrimination, in fact discharged an employee
whose draft record showed a tendency toward homosexuality.' 71 While
the entertainment world is more tolerant of deviant behavior than other
vocations, there is some discrimination, at least, in the technical and
administrative end.
Other incidents of employment discrimination are reported by the
G.A.A. Seeking employment as a cab driver, A was asked to explain
his 4F military classification. Discovering that his classification was due
to homosexuality, the employer refused to hire A, although A had sub-
mitted statements from two psychiatrists that his sexuality would not
interfere with the performance of his job.7 2 The Hadle Agency in New
York City, serving primarily the publishing industry, reports prospective
employees suspected of being homosexuals to employers. 173 The Inter-
national Business Machine Corp. ferrets-out sexual information from
prospective jobholders, asking such questions as, "Do you have a girl
friend?," "Exactly where do you socialize?," "Are you a homo-
sexual?"'7 It was further contended that "gay" employees of the firm
were dismissed upon discovery. The Household Finance Co. not only
refuses to hire homosexuals but considers them to be poor credit risks.
175
Banks, the All State Insurance Co., and the American Automobile
Association were also mentioned as discriminators. 176
The data supplied by the G.A.A., while unverified, is not surprising;
it has a ring of truth because of the generally prevailing attitude.
Based on the data tabulated in Table I, in the subheading "Careers,"
171. G.A.A.. Employment Discrimination Against Homosexuals. Supp. #1, at 12 (unpublished
report issued Feb. 3. 1971).
172. Id. at 4.
173. Id
174. Id at 5.
175. Id. at 4.
176. Id. at 6.
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only 24 homosexuals held jobs classified as unskilled. Furthermore, only
28 reported holding jobs in the blue-collar skilled craftsmen category
(and not all of the 28 can be considered as blue-collar workers). The bulk
of the reported homosexuals fell into the professionals, technical, mana-
gerial, fine arts and self-employed category (208), while 128 were em-
ployed in clerical and sales work. This may signify that the typical
homosexual is not interested in physical labor, whether skilled or un-
skilled. However, other factors could account for the white-collar inter-
est of the homosexual. As education increases, all job seekers tend to be
less interested in blue-collar work. The "big money" and prestige oppor-
tunities are in sales and management and in the professional and techni-
cal categories. While downgrading the blue-collar worker economically
and socially is unwarranted, mankind seeks entre to the most prestigious
jobs. To that extent, the homosexual is no different from the ambitious
heterosexual. But popular feeling persists, unverified, that the homosex-
ual looks for a job that does not require the flexing of muscles and where
fingernails can be kept clean.
Another possible explanation for the preferences of the homosexual
is that he seeks employment where there is greater acceptability. Because
professional, technical, managerial, and similar types of occupations
require considerably more education than blue-collar work, the homo-
sexual may find greater, although imperfect, tolerance for his way of life.
Still another explanation is the industrial growth and demand for em-
ployees since the end of World War II. While the number of skilled blue-
collar jobs has increased since 1945, they have not increased as rapidly
as white-collar jobs. 177 Job openings in the service, professional, techni-
cal, and managerial occupations have increased more rapidly than in the
blue-collar level and technology tends to wipe out unskilled jobs.
Another interesting facet of the data contained in "Careers" is that
fewhomosexuals hold jobs where union representation is widespread. It
is no secret that unions experience difficulty in organizing the white-
collar employee, where the homosexual is concentrated, although unions
have been more successful in recent years.' 78 This suggests that while
unions are no more receptive to the homosexual than other segments in
our society, the employer is responsible for most of the discrimination.
A recent phenomenon is the emergence of collective bargaining in the
177. 63 L.R.R. 81 (Sept. 26, 1966); 1963 CIVIL RIGHTS HEARINGS 1130.
178. Prospects for Organizing White-Collar Employees, LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK, 417-18
(1969).
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public employment sphere. While the Taft-Hartley Act exempts the pub-
lic employee from coverage, many state agencies engage in collective
bargaining and, by executive order, federal employees can be represented
by a union.1 79 Most public employees are white-collar workers and there
is considerable feeling that more public employees will join unions in the
future. Many are teachers employed by a local or state government.
Today, there is some tendency on the part of teacher and other profes-
sionals unions to protect the homosexual employee. For example, the
United Federation of Teachers (U.F.T.) has notified the Board of Edu-
cation in New York City that it will not tolerate the dismissal of licensed
and tenured homosexual teachers. And, according to the G.A.A., "an
unwritten agreement" has been negotiated "with the Board of Educa-
tion" that homosexuals will not lose their jobs.18
If public white collar unionism should continue to spread, espousing
a U.F.T. avant garde philosophy, homosexuals can be protected by
contract and the Norton type of decision.1"'
The sub-headings "Current Health" and "History of Psychiatric
Care" were included because some employers claim that the homosexual
is beset by physical and emotional problems. While the data presented
is not conclusive, it appears that he represents no greater health problem
than the heterosexual employee.
The employer unwilling to hire the homosexual has little difficulty in
gathering damaging information in this golden age of record keeping
and computers. His sources of information include contacts with pre-
vious employers, private investigators, employment agencies, civil serv-
ice records, F.B.I. dossiers, insurance records, and, more significantly,
draft, military, and police records (with or without conviction). The
G.A.A. claims that "69% of the major private employers in . . . [the]
City of New York require draft status information [and] 71% of the
major private employers ask for military records. Application for em-
ployment with the City of New York requires release of both draft and
military records."'812 The G.A.A. also reports that in addition to New
York City, "88% of the 100 civil service departments for which we have
application forms request information regarding civil service . . . or
179. ExEc. ORDER No. 10988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (comp. 1959-63); Exec. Order No. 11491, 3
C.F.R. § 100.735-451 (Supp. 1970).
180. G.A.A.. supra note 171,at 10.
181. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also notes 90-95 supra and accompanying text.
182. G.A.A., supra note 171, at 7.
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previous employment information." The G.A.A. reports that more than
100 job application forms used by private concerns in New York City
require military and insurance policy information. 3 It should be noted
that the investigation conducted by the G.A.A. was not exhaustive.
The F.B.I.. which engages in surveillance and investigation for many
reasons, has made dossiers available to government agencies, state and
federal. Thus, the homosexual seeking public or private employment
may find that the F.B.I. has supplied information, sometimes unverified.
Large firms routinely contact past employers and/or request references
before hiring an employee. War has become a routine part of life since
1941, subjecting most young males to the military draft. As a result,
much data of a confidential nature is available to the "right" party. The
G.A.A. claims that some insurance companies refuse to write life, theft,
fire, automobile, and other kinds of policies for the known homosexual,
who supposedly has a short life span and presents a greater risk. A few
private and many public employers request job applicants to explain why
insurance coverage was refused, which may put the spotlight on the
"gay" person. Homosexuals are arrested at "gay" bars and in other
public gathering places even though no crime is committed or charge
preferred, creating a permanent police record.
Through these and other sources, information can be acquired that
suggests increased difficulty for the homosexual seeking employment.
For this and other reasons, legislation may be necessary to protect
homosexuals and others.
A Fair Employment Law for Homosexuals
Since World War II, state and federal laws have been passed to pro-
tect minority races and religions, senior citizens, and women (who are
not, technically, a minority). Today, some effort is being expended to
pass legislation protecting the homosexual. While there is little chance
that such a law will be passed locally or nationally at the present time,
it can be anticipated that momentum will continue to gather to pass a
fair employment bill. Consequently, the type of legislation proposed will
be reviewed.
On January 6, 1971, a comprehensive bill was submitted by members
Clingan and Burden to the New York City Council." 4 Although the bill
183. Id. at 8-9.
184. Letter from the Gay Activists Alliance to the New York City Commission on Human
Rights, Feb. 1, 1971.
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was killed in committee, it was the first bill given public sponsorship.
The G.A.A. supported the Clingan-Burden bill as did some influential
citizens. 115
A similar bill was brought before the New York Assembly in Febru-
ary, 1971, sponsored by representatives Olivieri, Koppell, Solarz, Lei-
chter, Hochberg, Stein, Gottfried, Berle, Strelzin, Blumenthal and
Simon.' Another bill was proposed in the New York Senate on Febru-
ary 10, 1971, by Senator Ohrenstein. 187 The assembly bill was defeated,
surprisingly, by a margin of 84 to 60; there was more support for the
bill than this writer anticipated.
There is a greater likelihood that such legislation can be passed (even
though the probability is not great at the present time) in New York City
than in other cities or states or on a national level. Because of a more
progressive and liberal type of representation, and voters who favor the
liberal candidate, New York City is probably the ideal testing ground
for this type of legislation. Because of upstate representation in the State
of New York, there is little likelihood of passage at the state level
(however, the vote of 84-60 shows future possibility). There appears to
be no chance of passing a federal law in the near future.
New York City is the cultural and entertainment center of the United
States, possibly the world, where increasing publicity is being given, via
the mass media of communication and on Broadway, to the unfair
treatment of the homosexual. The councilman in New York City has to
look at this influential support.
A parallel can be drawn. In 1945, New York became the first state
to pass fair employment legislation to protect minorities."' 8 Gradually,
other states passed similar bills, and a federal law was enacted in 1964
prohibiting racial discrimination by public and private employers, un-
ions, and employment agencies.' 89 New York State has been a leader in
avant garde legislation, exercising considerable influence elsewhere.
Should New York City pass a fair employment bill to protect the homo-
sexual, it will influence the passage of similar legislation elsewhere. In
1961, Illinois passed legislation repealing criminal sanctions against
consenting adults who engage privately in homosexual activities;
Connecticut and Oregon passed similar legislation in 1971.190
185. G.A.A., supra note 171, at 14. The City Council Committee on General Welfare voted 7
to 5 to keep the bill in committee. N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1972, at 1, col. 4.
186. #4186, N.Y., 1971-72 Regular Sessions.
187. #3646. N.Y.. 1971-72 Regular Sessions.
188. M. BERGER, EQUALITY BY STATLTE (1952).
189. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) et. seq. (1964).
190. See notes 2-3 supra.
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The Clingan-Burden bill is aimed at the elimination of prejudice based
on "sexual orientation," permitting a city administrative agency to
undertake educational programming, initiate investigations, and receive
and adjudicate complaints. The bill provides in part:
1. It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:
a. For an employer, because of the age, race, creed, color, national
origin (or), sex, or sexual orientation of any individual, to
refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employ-
ment such individual or to discriminate against such individual
in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of em-
ployment.
b. For an employment agency to discriminate against any indi-
vidual because of his age, race, creed, color (or), national
origin, sex, or sexual orientation, in receiving, classifying, dis-
posing or otherwise acting upon applicants for its services or in
referring an applicant or applicants to an employer or
employers.
c. For a labor organization, because of the age, race, creed, color,
national origin, (or) sex, or sexual orientation of any individual,
to exclude or to expel from its membership such individuals or
to discriminate in any way against any of its members or
against any employer or any individual employed by an
employer.
d. For any employer or employment agency to print or circulate
or cause to be printed or circulated any statement, advertise-
ment or publication, or to use any form of application for em-
ployment or to make any inquiry in connection with prospective
employment, which expresses, directly or indirectly, any limita-
tion, ,specification or discrimination as to age, race, creed,
color, national origin, (or) sex, or sexual orientation, or any in-
tent to make any such limitation, specification or discrimina-
tion, unless based upon a bona tide occupational qualification.
e. For any employer, labor organization or employment agency to
discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against any person
because he has opposed any practices forbidden under this title
or because he had filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any
proceeding under this title.
I-a. It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any employer,
labor organization, employment agency or any joint labor-manage-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss4/1
FAIR EMPLOYMENT
ment committee controlling apprentice training programs:
a. To select persons for an apprentice training program registered
with the State of New York on any basis other than their quali-
fications, as determined by objective criteria which permit
review;
b. To deny to or withhold from any person because of his race,
creed, color, national origin, (or) sex, or sexual orientation the
right to be admitted to or participate in a guidance program, an
apprenticeship training program, on-the-job training program,
or other occupational training or retraining program;
c. To discriminate against any person in his pursuit of such pro-
grams or to discriminate against such a person in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of such programs because of race,
creed, color, national origin, (or) sex, or sexual orientation;
d. To print or circulate or cause to be printed or circulated any
statement, advertisement or publication, or to use any form of
application for such programs or to make any inquiry in con-
nection with such program which expresses, directly or in-
directly, any limitation, specification or discrimination as to
race, creed, color, national origin. (or) sex, or sexual orienta-
tion. or any intent to make any such limitation, specification or
discrimination, unless based on a bona fide occupational
qualification.'
The bill is a replica of the fair employment legislation currently in
effect in New York,' with the additional prohibition against discrimi-
nation based on "sexual orientation." The bill, generally speaking, pro-
hibits employer, union, and employment agency discrimination against
the homosexual and ferreting-out and circulating information pertaining
to "sexual orientation."
The effectiveness of the Clingan-Burden bill is questionable. The bill
does not prohibit the employer from refusing to hire an applicant con-
victed of a homosexual crime or dishonorably discharged from the mil-
itary for homosexual activities. If an employer abides by a general policy
not to hire ex-convicts and those with less than an honorable discharge,
the homosexual could be refused employment without penalty. How-
ever, the employer hiring ex-convicts and those without an honorable
discharge would violate the Clingan-Burden bill if the homosexual was
refused equal employment opportunity.
Consensual homosexual activity is a crime in all states except Illinois,
191. To the Council, City of New York, Int. No. 475, at 2-4.
192. 8 BNA. FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE MANUAL451:875 (1971).
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Connecticut and Oregon. Any legislative attempt to assure fair employ-
ment for the homosexual criminally convicted bristles with technical,
social, and legal problems. Not only would there be difficulty in passing
fair employment legislation, but repealing the state criminal laws will
prove difficult and of long duration. A more effective manner of hitting
at homosexual discrimination would be the passage of a federal fair
employment bill to protect the convicted homosexual. Congress has the
power to pass such legislation under the interstate commerce clause,
pre-empting state legislation having a negative effect upon the homo-
sexual community. While there is some question of limiting state crimi-
nal legislation by passing a civil fair employment bill, the interstate
commerce clause is probably broad enough to assure constitutionality.
Most state laws and the federal fair employment law provide for
"bona fide" exemptions, permitting the employer to discriminate after
securing government approval. Based on the University of Minnesota
case previously reviewed, 93 where the homosexual, surrounded in his
work by young children, was denied employment, a Board of Education
could secure a "bona fide" exemption for public schools. While there is
little evidence to suggest that the homosexual teacher is after the young
student, many believe this is a fact, and a commission charged with
enforcing and interpreting a fair employment bill could make a "bona
fide" exception.
Based on the data supplied by the Mattachine Society of Los Angeles,
few homosexuals hold blue collar jobs where unions control hiring halls,
apprentice training programs, etc. Thus the Clingan-Burden bill would
have little impact upon unions representing blue collar workers. How-
ever, homosexuals gravitate toward the teaching profession, and the
number of public school teachers joining unions has been increasing.
While teachers' unions may be more hospitable to the homosexual than
other unions, there is, nevertheless, at least some discrimination, and
unions seeking employment opportunity for the homosexual teacher
would be aided by the proposed legislation.
Some Additional Comments
Novels, plays, and newspaper articles with homosexual themes appear
with increasing frequency, showing greater understanding and requesting
193. McConnell v. Anderson, 316 F. Supp. 809 (D. Minn. 1970), rev'd, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir.
1971).
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or demanding greater toleration.'94 However, the bulk of our society
probably views the homosexual as a sexual deviate, a psychotic who
indulges in child-molestation, unsuitable for integration into the work
force.'95
Organized religions supplied the fuel, initially, for the public distaste
for the homosexual. In fact, criminal laws prohibiting homosexual con-
duct can be traced to biblical literature. 9 ' Following the law of England,
the Puritans successfully urged the suppression of homosexuality in the
colonies. The Victorian era brought little if any change in the public
attitude toward the homosexual. Currently, church leaders express views
seeking greater tolerance for the homosexual than in the past."7 This
change in attitude could help change society's image of the "gay" peo-
ple. Yet, basic Christian and Judaic doctrine continues to place homo-
sexual behavior in a sinful category.""
In many ways, time has brought about a situation at odds with past
events and common thought. Hebraic-Christian societies have, in the
past, looked to religion for moral leadership and guidance, and legal
institutions followed traditional goals established by influential religious
leaders. With rapid political, economic, and technical changes taking
place since World War II and the diminishing influence of the religioso,
the judicial branch of government, particularly the United States Su-
preme Court may have become a more influential moral pacesetter than
organized religion.
This pronouncement at first blush may seem strange and heretical to
the traditionalist and the uninitiated, but the "facts of life" may support
this conclusion. Leadership in most religious organizations is in the
hands of older clerics who seek to preserve past traditions or fear con-
demnation from parishioners when favoring change. A "don't-rock-the-
194. R. ANDERSON, TEA AND SYMPATHY (1953); M. CROWLEY, Boys IN THE BAND (1969); J.
ACKERLY, MY FATHER AND MYSELF (1969); J. GERASSI, THE BOYS OF BOISE (1966); Fairness
Jor Homoxexuals. Washington Post, Feb. 2. 1971, editorial page; U.S. Homosexuals Gain in
Trying to Persuade Society to .Accept Them, Wall Street Journal. July 17, 1968, at 1, col. 1; City
Lifts Job Curbior Homosexuals, N.Y. Times, May 9. 1969, at I, col.2.
195, In interviews with responsible leaders in the homosexual community, I was impressed with
the code of ethics that is followed, similar to that in the "straight" community.
196, M. BUCKLEY. MORALITY AND THE HOMOSEXUAL 116 (1959); GENESIS 19:5; JUDGES 19:24;
1 CORINTHIANS 6:9; 1 TIMOTHY 1:9; W. CHURCHILL. HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR AMONG MALES 202-
09 (967).
197. Homosexual Law Reform. 114 AMERICA 278 (Feb. 26, 1966).
198. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA. SEXUALITY AND THE HUMAN COMMUNITY 17-20 (1970).
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boat" philosophy describes much of the managerial decision-making in
religion. Changes, consequently, are difficult to promote, except with
persistent and strong pressures from sources within and without the
church. The typical jurist, at least at a state and municipal level, suffers
from similar controls and inertia; subject to re-election or re-
appointment, he is often fair game for politicians. "While the district
judge in a federal court holds a life-time appointment, he generally
comes from and resides within the district in which he sits, clinging to
familiar ideology and influences. The United States Supreme Court
Justices not only hold life-time appointments, but are subjected to a new,
often a more sophisticated and "advanced" set of influences, with less
need to fit in a more static social structure. It is for this reason that the
avante garde moral leadership can come from the Supreme Court and
other jurists, while the religioso in the field sticks to tradition to satisfy
his flock and superiors.
Supreme Court Justices can "afford" to be moral opportunists. For
example, the Supreme Court, far ahead of the masses and religious
leaders, was able to condemn segregated schooling as the mark of a
racist society.'99 The Supreme Court in essence assumed the role of the
moral persuader. The lower federal courts have already begun to show
greater understanding toward the homosexual.2 0
Another factor promising change is the make up of the voting popula-
tion. The liberal legislator of the past, if that be the proper label, could
not afford, politically speaking, to support a fair employment bill for
homosexuals. With those eighteen years of age or older voting, a new
group will wield considerable influence in state and federal elections.20'
Younger voters, on the whole, seem more willing to tolerate change
than older people. It seems plausible to assume that the liberal legislator
will be more predisposed to support a bill aiding the homosexual, influ-
enced by the younger voters. An attitudinal survey made in Australia
showed that 22 per cent of those polled supported legislation legalizing
homosexual play in private between consenting adults.2 2 Percentage-
wise, the younger people sampled were even more favorably disposed
199. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
200. McConnell v. Anderson, 316 F. Supp. 809 (D.C. Minn. 1970), rev'd, 451 F.2d 193(8th Cir. 1971); Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Scott v. Macy, 347 F.2d 182
(D.C. Cir. 1965); Scott v. Macy, 402 F.2d 644 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
201. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
202. Chappell and Wilson, Public Attitudes to the Reform of the Law Relating to Abortion and
Homosexuality, 42 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 120, 178 (1968).
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toward the abolition of criminal sanctions than older people. This raises
the possibility that younger voters will support a fair employment bill.
Yet there is a difference between the lifting of criminal sanctions for
homosexual play and fair employment. The Australian sampling only
covered the criminal sanctions imposed upon the homosexual and not
his employment status-it is possible that many favor the elimination
of criminal penalties without favoring a fair employment policy.
The added dosage of education supplied to large numbers also in-
creases the possibility that fair employment legislation for the homosex-
ual is possible. In the Australian survey, 48 per cent of those polled with
some college education favored repealing the criminal sanctions, while
only 23 per cent with a high school diploma favored repeal, dropping
to 9 per cent for those with a grammar school education.21 3 Based upon
occupation, which is related to education, 45 per cent of those classified
as professionals favored a change in the Australian law, compared to 16
per cent for laborers. It seems reasonable to conclude that education
increases toleration for the "undesirable." With overall educational lev-
els higher in the United States than in Australia, it is possible that the
homosexual will find even greater acceptance in the United States.
Religiosos in the United States generally hold that true happiness is
harvested through the family. To rear a family, marriage is considered
an absolute essential. Given such a social and religious climate, the
homosexual does not contribute to society's welfare. The concept of
marriage and family as the good or even the best way of life is being
challenged today. While divorce is a simple matter today, unhappily
married couples remain together. 24 Given such a situation, the homosex-
ual in the market place is no worse off than the family man. Employers
reluctantly hire those with family difficulties. Psychiatrists claim that
many homosexuals are unhappy, prone to mental difficulty. 25 But if the
married person is also unhappy, which can lead to mental disequili-
brium, the homosexual is no worse off, and the employer faces no
greater risk by employing the homosexual. In fact, if society would
fully accept the homosexual, there is the distinct possibility that his
mental health, if troubled, would improve considerably, a boon to the
employer seeking the happy employee.
203. Wilson and Chappell, Australian Attitudes Toward Abortion, Prostitution and
Homosexuality, 40 AUSTRALIAN Q. 1, 12-14 (1967).
204. H. LANTZ & E. SNYDER, MARRIAGE 415 (2d ed. 1969).
205. 1. BIEBER, HOMOSEXUALITY 18 (1962).
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When organized religions, Judaism and Catholicism, asserted that
God willed an increase in population, the death rate was much higher
than today. Under such circumstances, married people had to be encour-
aged to procreate. If procreation were not encouraged, the religious
group would not grow powerful, and the necessary muscle to provide the
necessities of life would be unavailable. It seems fair to conclude that
the biblical interpretations resorted to by the religioso were self serving
to some extent, given the acknowledged need to multiply. Given the
current state of medical knowledge and the population explosion, limit-
ing the birth rate seems desirable, a fact acknowledged by many religious
leaders."' The exclusive homosexual cannot swell the ranks of mankind,
and the practicing bisexual may also limit population growth, a factor
which could influence social acceptability for the sexual invert. In this
limited context, the homosexual can be viewed as a contributor to so-
ciety rather than the pariah of biblical origin.
The crucial role played by religion in 17th century England is difficult
to imagine today. Everyone had to attend church and pay tithes; pulpits
were used to make political announcements, books were censored by the
religioso, teachers were licensed by a bishop; and the Bible provided
guidance to all problems.2 1
The right to establish public morality, the group interest, has given
way to greater concern for individual choice. For example, what was
regulated as immoral behavior in colonial America is tolerated, even
accepted, today. Within the family there are differences between parents
and children concerning what is acceptable behavior. Parents hold to
different standards from their parents. Yet, if three generations are to
live side-by-side, each level must learn to tolerate the behavior of others.
It can be reasoned that no one should be punished for a life or sex style
that does not seriously injure or, perhaps, seriously offend others follow-
ing another code of behavior. A society that eulogizes individuality but
demands that everyone live up to an institutionally determined behavior
pattern speaks with a forked tongue. It is even uncertain whether society
has a right to demand conformity even if it is seriously affronted.
Many today, young and old, are not offended by homosexuality pri-
vately negotiated between consenting adults. Others who are offended
206. Christianity Today, A Protestant Affirmation on the Control of Human Reproduction.
Vol. XIII, No. 3, at 18 (Nov. 8, 1968). A consensus statement from a Protestant Symposium on
the Control of Human Reproduction (held August 27-31. 1968).
207. C. HILL, THE CENTURY OF REVOLUTION, 1603-1714, at 75-86 (1961).
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find it difficult to establish injury, let alone serious injury, to their or
society's well-being; the legislation enacted in England and several states
is testimony to this position. Public intercourse between husband and
wife and members of the opposite sex would offend many people; yet
intercourse in private, even among the unmarried, is no longer consid-
ered an evil. Kinsey estimated that 95 percent of all males engaged in
some type of sexual play punishable as a crime. 218 Psychiatrists postulate
that heterosexual play out of wedlock and an infinite variety of sexual
practices are natural. Given the breadth of the psychiatric point of view,
how far removed is homosexual activity from acceptable heterosexual
activity?
208. Note. Post-Kinsey: Voluntary Sex Relations as Criminal Offenses, 17 U. CH. L. REv. 162,
163 (1949).
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